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World Oil Outlook - Opec

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• In the case of biofuels, it is assumed that over the medium-term, first generation<br />

biofuels production expands more rapidly than in the Reference Case:<br />

China and India emerge as significant biofuels producers; future targets, as yet<br />

unannounced, accelerate biofuels development; costs for advanced technologies<br />

are reduced considerably, especially in the long-term; and already in the current<br />

decade second generation technology becomes commercially viable. Taking all<br />

this into consideration, the major changes occur in the longer term and by 2035,<br />

total biofuels supply is assumed to reach 9.2 mb/d.<br />

With these factors in mind, the LSS scenario has been developed. It portrays an<br />

outlook that could be regarded as feasible. Table 4.5 documents the supply levels for<br />

each of the elements of liquids supply in the scenario.<br />

In this scenario, however, the surge of non-OPEC crude oil cannot be indefinitely<br />

maintained. In fact, over the long-term, an accelerated exploitation of the finite<br />

resources available, even with the larger URR assumption, points to resource<br />

constraints for some regions emerging over the projection period. Additionally, the<br />

assumption for additional shale oil foresees a similarly accelerated supply over the next<br />

10–15 years, but this rapid expansion does not continue indefinitely in the scenario.<br />

Thus, since demand is assumed to be unaffected in this scenario, OPEC crude supply<br />

by 2035 has risen back to 26 mb/d after falling to below in 2025. But this is still well<br />

below current output levels.<br />

Possible implications for OPEC crude<br />

The change in expectations relative to the Reference Case is startling in all three cases.<br />

On the one hand, they demonstrate genuine concern over security of demand; on the<br />

other, it has also been seen that circumstances could arise where considerably more<br />

OPEC crude oil will be needed than the Reference Case suggests.<br />

It is clear that the separate drivers, economy and supply surges are substantial elements<br />

in their own way. Figure 4.1 brings together the implications for OPEC crude<br />

supply in all three scenarios. The two downside risk cases involve either a stagnant call<br />

on OPEC crude or a falling one, while the HEG scenario sees substantially higher<br />

production levels. By 2035, the expectations for OPEC crude are very similar across<br />

the downside risk scenarios, at 25–26 mb/d, while the HEG scenario sees the need for<br />

OPEC crude to rise to over 43 mb/d.<br />

Naturally, the feasibility of these OPEC supply paths needs to be questioned.<br />

The dramatic fall in supply in the downside scenarios, as well as the rapid increase in<br />

the HEG scenario may not be sustainable, in which case, the behaviour of the drivers<br />

133<br />

Chapter<br />

4

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