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Pay TV phase three document - Stakeholders - Ofcom

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<strong>Pay</strong> <strong>TV</strong> <strong>phase</strong> <strong>three</strong> <strong>document</strong> – non-confidential version<br />

1.55 We have considered and discounted several arguments for extending this obligation<br />

to retailers on Sky’s own platform(s), specifically:<br />

� We do not see evidence for high margins within Sky’s retail business, which<br />

might require an intervention to ensure fair and effective competition.<br />

� We acknowledge that an extension of the remedy would make it easier for<br />

alternative retailers to build up a large subscriber base, possibly increasing their<br />

ability to bid for content rights, and reducing upstream barriers to entry. We do<br />

not however believe this is necessary, since it should be possible to address<br />

Sky’s existing subscribers through other platforms such as those using DTT.<br />

Furthermore, the retail subscriber base is only one of several factors which<br />

influence companies’ ability to bid.<br />

1.56 Should a must-offer apply for the purposes of onward retail to commercial<br />

premises? We propose not to extend the remedy to cover retail to commercial<br />

customers:<br />

� We do not see evidence for restricted distribution of premium content to<br />

commercial premises. Concerns have been put to us about retail pricing, but to<br />

the extent that there are in fact problems with the current level of pricing, these<br />

cannot reasonably be addressed by a wholesale must-offer obligation with prices<br />

set on a retail-minus basis as we propose (see paragraph 1.59 below).<br />

� We acknowledge that an extension of the remedy might make it somewhat easier<br />

for alternative retailers to build up revenues quickly, reducing upstream barriers<br />

to entry by avoiding the time taken to build up a base of commercial subscribers.<br />

We do not however believe the effect is likely to be sufficient for such an<br />

extension of the remedy to be appropriate.<br />

1.57 We therefore propose to take account of concerns relating to the current level of<br />

pricing for commercial premises in our thinking on remedies relating to the way<br />

sports rights are bought and sold (see paragraph 1.77 onwards below).<br />

1.58 Should we set conditions of supply, particularly prices? We believe it to be<br />

necessary for us to determine some of the conditions of supply within the offer, in<br />

particular prices. Not doing so would risk rendering the remedy ineffective for two<br />

reasons:<br />

� The evidence of commercial negotiations to date suggests that a requirement to<br />

agree prices commercially would lead after a protracted period of negotiation to a<br />

stalemate.<br />

� The only prices which other retailers might be able to agree with Sky are likely to<br />

be closely based on the current cable rate-card. However, as we discuss in more<br />

detail below, we do not believe this would allow competitors to Sky to build a<br />

viable business, and it would not therefore address the detriment we have<br />

identified.<br />

1.59 What approach should we take to setting prices? We believe that there are a<br />

number of potential advantages associated with setting prices on a cost-plus basis,<br />

notably:<br />

� It would allow us to set prices in a competitively neutral manner, without for<br />

example having to make any assumptions about the distribution technology used.<br />

11

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