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Pay TV phase three document - Stakeholders - Ofcom

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<strong>Pay</strong> <strong>TV</strong> <strong>phase</strong> <strong>three</strong> <strong>document</strong> – non-confidential version<br />

ensure compliance with its interpretation of the margin squeeze test applied by<br />

the OFT 547 .<br />

� Scenario 1: applies a discount rate to future cashflows so as to obtain a ROT of<br />

1.5%, the figure adopted by the OFT in its ex post margin squeeze test. Scenario<br />

1 is therefore essentially our approximation of the OFT methodology, using Sky’s<br />

current costs.<br />

� Scenario 2: applies a discount rate of 10.3% to the retailer’s future cashflows,<br />

which is our estimate of Sky’s cost of capital. We base this scenario on a retail<br />

business approximating to Sky’s business – with Sky’s costs (including DSat<br />

transmission costs), Sky’s retail prices and Sky’s opening asset base at the start<br />

of the period. We include a figure for intangible assets for Sky, based on the cost<br />

of acquiring subscribers at the start of the period. We also include a terminal<br />

value based on an estimate of future cashflows.<br />

� Scenario 3: still applies a discount rate of 10.3%, but reflects the scale of a likely<br />

‘large’ entrant, assuming a subscriber base of <strong>three</strong> million after 10 years. We<br />

assume that each competitor incurs fixed retailing costs of about £[ � ] million<br />

per year (including transmission of premium content over DSat) 548 .<br />

� Scenario 4: is the same as Scenario 3, but makes an allowance for DTT<br />

transmission costs, as DTT is the most likely technology for potential competitors<br />

to use in the short to medium term, and the technology which is most likely to<br />

yield the greatest number of additional subscribers. Here we assume that each<br />

competitor incurs fixed retailing costs of about £[ � ] million per year (including<br />

transmission of premium content over DTT) 549 .<br />

� Scenario 5: is the same as Scenario 4, but reflects the scale of a likely ‘small’<br />

entrant and assumes a smaller subscriber base of one million after 10 years.<br />

Again we assume that each competitor incurs fixed retailing costs of about £[ � ]<br />

million per year (including transmission of premium content over DTT).<br />

� Scenario 6: is calculated on a cost-plus basis, using a NPV approach assuming a<br />

cost of capital of 10.3%.<br />

9.168 The table below shows a range of prices that have emerged from our analysis, based<br />

on these different pricing scenarios. The final row of the table presents a weighted<br />

average of these prices, weighted by the number of Sky’s retail subscribers<br />

purchasing each of these packages, which gives a broad aggregate measure with<br />

which to compare the different pricing approaches.<br />

547<br />

This is to the best of our understanding given that Sky declined to provide us with its calculations<br />

as noted in paragraph 9.122.<br />

548 Assuming fixed premium transmission costs for DSat of £[ � ]m.<br />

549 For the purposes of deriving an estimate of premium transmission costs we take an estimated cost<br />

of £[ � ]m per videostream. However, we assume that this is spread amongst retailers using<br />

videostream sharing and simulcrypt arrangements, resulting in a per-retailer fixed cost of £[ � ]m.<br />

301

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