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Pay TV phase three document - Stakeholders - Ofcom

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<strong>Pay</strong> <strong>TV</strong> <strong>phase</strong> <strong>three</strong> <strong>document</strong> – non-confidential version<br />

greater incentive to refuse to supply new or smaller pay <strong>TV</strong> retailers than it did to<br />

withdraw its premium channels from Virgin Media 353 . Sky argued that the outcome of<br />

<strong>Ofcom</strong>’s own vertical arithmetic analysis of supply on DTT supports its position that it<br />

has an incentive to supply 354 .<br />

6.20 Sky also criticised <strong>Ofcom</strong> 355 for setting out in Second <strong>Pay</strong> <strong>TV</strong> Consultation two<br />

possible explanations for a failure to supply – i.e. Sky intentionally withholding<br />

supply, and Sky not being willing to lower the price to a level that any retailer would<br />

be prepared to pay – and not properly analysing how the reasons for a failure to<br />

supply might affect possible remedies. Sky argued that if the reason why supply is<br />

not occurring is attributable to the inefficiency of other retailers then it would clearly<br />

be disproportionate to remedy this by imposing a burden on Sky.<br />

6.21 Sky criticised the part of <strong>Ofcom</strong>’s “vertical arithmetic” model which analysed the<br />

effects on Sky’s revenues on supplying or withdrawing supply from Virgin Media 356 .<br />

Among other points, Sky argued that:<br />

� [ � ].<br />

� [ � ].<br />

� Even if long-term switching were to occur, withdrawal of supply would be initially<br />

loss-making, and would only be profitable over a long time, which would not be<br />

attractive to Sky given market uncertainty.<br />

� The figures in the model indicated a net increase in premium channel subscribers<br />

if it withdrew supply, which was unlikely in practice.<br />

6.22 Other respondents broadly agreed with our assessment of Sky’s incentives to<br />

wholesale its channels to other retailers.<br />

� The BBC said that there were a number of incentives which might motivate Sky<br />

against supplying its channels to competing retailers and/or competing platforms,<br />

in particular the desire to prevent the emergence or growth of potential retail or<br />

platform competitors. The BBC also said that where Sky supplied Virgin Media<br />

with wholesale channels, it had an incentive to provide the lowest acceptable<br />

quality, and not to provide any additional features. This was because Sky had a<br />

strong incentive to ensure that consumers wishing to access Sky’s premium<br />

channels got a better deal, both in quality and price terms if they did so through<br />

Sky satellite platform rather than through any other pay <strong>TV</strong> platform. 357<br />

� BT supported our position that due to its vertical integration Sky has limited<br />

incentives to wholesale those channels to third parties on any basis that allows<br />

353 Sky response Section 5, paragraph 2.9.<br />

354 Sky response, Section 5, paragraph 2.8.<br />

355 Section 5, paragraph 2.31, page 69.<br />

356 Section 5, paragraph 2.11, pages 64 to 66.<br />

357 BBC response, page 4.<br />

183

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