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Pay TV phase three document - Stakeholders - Ofcom

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<strong>Pay</strong> <strong>TV</strong> <strong>phase</strong> <strong>three</strong> <strong>document</strong> – non-confidential version<br />

current price is constrained to competitive levels. Figure 17 shows the estimates of<br />

consumer elasticity for Sky Sports and Sky Sports and Movies Mix packages. 139<br />

Figure 17 Estimates of Sky Sports subscribers’ elasticities and wholesale critical<br />

loss<br />

1 Minimum elasticity to constrain a<br />

wholesale monopolist (critical loss)<br />

Sky Sports<br />

and Movies<br />

Mix<br />

Sky Sports<br />

Mix<br />

[ � ] [ � ]<br />

2 Sky conjoint estimate [ � ] [ � ]<br />

Source: Critical loss: see Appendix 10 of annex 6 to <strong>Ofcom</strong>’s Second <strong>Pay</strong> <strong>TV</strong> Consultation; Sky<br />

conjoint: [ � ] supplied to <strong>Ofcom</strong> by Sky in July 2007<br />

4.143 Sky did not provide any detailed support for its arguments about why its elasticity<br />

estimates from its Conjoint Study were unreliable. We do not consider its comments<br />

are a basis for dismissing these estimates, and we note that Sky chose to rely on<br />

them in response to our First <strong>Pay</strong> <strong>TV</strong> Consultation.<br />

4.144 The relatively small samples in <strong>Ofcom</strong>’s willingness to pay survey (40 for Movies Mix<br />

only, 147 for Sports Mix only and 95 for Sports and Movies Mix) means that the<br />

confidence intervals around the estimates of elasticity are wide and the results are<br />

sensitive to changes in assumptions used. Moreover there is a strong risk that these<br />

results will have been subject to “stated preference bias”, i.e. the tendency of survey<br />

respondents to exaggerate their willingness to switch in response to a price rise. We<br />

therefore do not rely on our estimates of elasticity derived from our willingness to pay<br />

survey.<br />

4.145 The results of Sky’s conjoint study suggest that a wholesale price rise for Sky Sports<br />

and Movies Mix and Sky Sports packages would be likely to be profitable. Sky’s<br />

conjoint estimate continues to point to a narrow market. For the reasons set out in<br />

paragraphs 4.43 to 4.45 and 4.52 to 4.53 we in any case interpret this analysis<br />

cautiously.<br />

4.146 The elasticity estimates discussed above relate to demand facing Sky, as opposed to<br />

the market demand that would be faced by a hypothetical monopolist. A monopolist<br />

supplier of premium sports channels would be likely to face less price-sensitive<br />

customers than Sky does at present (because some Sky customers who have a<br />

strong demand for premium sports channels could see Setanta as a substitute). As<br />

such, with a hypothetical monopolist it is likely that elasticities would be even further<br />

below the minimum elasticity in the critical loss test – further strengthening the view<br />

that the market is narrow. 140<br />

139 Where the estimated critical loss elasticity (line 1) exceeds the estimated elasticity (line 2) we<br />

conclude that consumers are not price sensitive enough to constrain a monopolist from raising prices.<br />

140 Sky has suggested that it sets its wholesale prices to avoid a margin squeeze infringement (source<br />

Sky response dated 28 July 2008 to <strong>Ofcom</strong>’s information request dated 2 July 2008, paragraph 9).<br />

85

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