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Pay TV phase three document - Stakeholders - Ofcom

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<strong>Pay</strong> <strong>TV</strong> <strong>phase</strong> <strong>three</strong> <strong>document</strong> – non-confidential version<br />

Retail bundling<br />

4.56 With respect to Sky’s specific criticism relating to retail bundling, our view is that Sky<br />

mischaracterises our assessment of the constraints on suppliers of premium<br />

channels. The assessment of critical loss only considers the indirect constraint from<br />

final consumers switching away as a result of a full pass though of the price rise.<br />

However, we also separately consider the opportunity for direct demand side<br />

substitution, or direct supply side substitution.<br />

4.57 To take Sky’s example as an illustration, if Fox News (a 24 hour news channel) was<br />

to impose a carriage fee price rise on retailers, a retailer such as Sky or Virgin could<br />

switch away to alternative substitute 24 hour news channels – for example Sky<br />

News, BBC News, CNN, or CNBC. Alternatively, other channel suppliers might be<br />

incentivised to enter the market in response to a price rise. In this case, direct<br />

demand side substitution would be likely to constrain a channel wholesaler.<br />

Relevance of previous findings<br />

Our position in the Second <strong>Pay</strong> <strong>TV</strong> Consultation<br />

4.58 In our first consultation we reviewed a number of recent previous findings of other UK<br />

and European competition authorities in their investigations into <strong>TV</strong> markets. We<br />

stated that previous decisions can help identify relevant issues, but they do not<br />

negate the need for a full review of the relevant markets based on available<br />

evidence.<br />

4.59 A number of previous findings from other competition authorities 78 have found that<br />

rights to show certain types of <strong>TV</strong> content are in narrow markets and that the joint<br />

selling of these rights can lead to competition concerns downstream.<br />

4.60 With respect to FAPL, the Commission Decision on the joint selling of media rights 79<br />

found that <strong>TV</strong> rights to premium football events that are played regularly throughout<br />

the year were themselves a relevant market.<br />

4.61 There have been several findings from other competition authorities that consider<br />

that the upstream provision of movies in the first pay <strong>TV</strong> window is in a narrow<br />

content market 80 .<br />

4.62 The Competition Commission set out its conclusions on market definition in its<br />

investigation into the acquisition by Sky of a 17.9% stake in I<strong>TV</strong> (the ‘Competition<br />

78 For example, Commission decision COMP C.2-37.398 Joint selling of commercial rights of the<br />

UEFA Champions League, or Commission decision COMP/C.2/37.217 Joint selling of media rights of<br />

the German Bundesliga.<br />

79 Case COMP/C-2/38.173.<br />

80 For example, Commission decisions, Case No COMP/M.3595 - Sony / MGM (2005), Case No<br />

COMP/M.2050 – Vivendi / Canal+ / Seagram (2000), or COMP/M.2876, Newscorp/Telepiù (2003).<br />

64

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