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Pay TV phase three document - Stakeholders - Ofcom

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<strong>Pay</strong> <strong>TV</strong> <strong>phase</strong> <strong>three</strong> <strong>document</strong> – non-confidential version<br />

4.137 In response to our First <strong>Pay</strong> <strong>TV</strong> Consultation, Sky presented results of a study it<br />

commissioned on the [ � ] 131 [ � ] 132 . Sky claimed [ � ]”. 133<br />

4.138 In our Second <strong>Pay</strong> <strong>TV</strong> Consultation we also presented evidence of consumers’<br />

willingness to pay for premium sports channels 134 .<br />

4.139 Our view was that this additional evidence was less likely to be subject to stated<br />

preference bias, although our concerns about whether we had assessed a price rise<br />

from competitive levels remained. Nonetheless, the evidence from Sky’s Conjoint<br />

Study and from the central estimates of our own willingness to pay survey suggested<br />

that a SSNIP on Sky’s wholesale channels could indeed be profitable.<br />

Respondents’ views<br />

4.140 Sky argued that no evidential weight can be placed on our demand elasticity<br />

estimates derived from our willingness to pay survey 135 . Sky also argued that its own<br />

estimates of consumer responses to price rises were similarly unreliable, as they did<br />

not seek to examine spin-down in response to price increases, and because<br />

consumer research was not a perfect predictor of consumers’ behaviour. 136<br />

4.141 FAPL argued that our conclusions from our elasticity estimates were unreliable<br />

because 137 :<br />

84<br />

� We had not provided confidence intervals around our estimates.<br />

� The data on willingness to pay from which <strong>Ofcom</strong>’s elasticities were derived<br />

underestimated consumer demand for Sky Sports channels at current prices 138 .<br />

Our current view<br />

4.142 We interpret evidence on consumer price elasticity with caution. This is because we<br />

would expect any profit maximising firm to price where a further price increase is just<br />

unprofitable. Hence, evidence of an elastic response to further price changes may<br />

indicate that a firm is pricing at the profit maximising level regardless of whether the<br />

131 Conjoint analysis asks respondents to choose between a series of products with different sets of<br />

features. The trade-offs made are analysed to assess the relative importance of each of the different<br />

features.<br />

132<br />

See Annex 6, Appendix 4 of <strong>Ofcom</strong>’s September 2008 consultation for details. Sky conjoint: [ � ]<br />

supplied to <strong>Ofcom</strong> by Sky in July 2007.<br />

133 Sky response to <strong>Ofcom</strong>’s First <strong>Pay</strong> <strong>TV</strong> Consultation Annex 2 paragraph 2.17.<br />

134 See Annex 10 of <strong>Ofcom</strong>’s Second <strong>Pay</strong> <strong>TV</strong> Consultation for details.<br />

135 Sky Response of 1 June 2009 to <strong>Ofcom</strong>’s Second <strong>Pay</strong> <strong>TV</strong> Consultation “Additional comments on<br />

<strong>Ofcom</strong>’s analysis of market definition and market power in the pay <strong>TV</strong> review” paragraph 4.3 and<br />

Annex 5.<br />

136 Ibid. Annex 1 paragraph 2.8.<br />

137 Sky also commented on our estimates of elasticity, see Appendix 2 to Annex 6.<br />

138 FAPL response to our Second <strong>Pay</strong> <strong>TV</strong> Consultation page 43.

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