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Pay TV phase three document - Stakeholders - Ofcom

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<strong>Pay</strong> <strong>TV</strong> <strong>phase</strong> <strong>three</strong> <strong>document</strong> – non-confidential version<br />

� [ � ] 437 . It seems that, on balance, there is unlikely to be a substantial change in<br />

the way these rights are awarded in the UK in the short to medium-term.<br />

6.151 Not only does Sky not provide onward supply of services based on these rights, it<br />

also does not exploit them fully itself. Sky’s premium movies channels are currently<br />

available on SVoD only through Sky Player to the PC. This presumably reflects the<br />

fact that its satellite platform is not well suited to the exploitation of these rights.<br />

6.152 Sky’s strategy in relation to these rights is illustrated by evidence from information<br />

request responses, in particular, [ � ] 438 .<br />

6.153 [ � ] 439 [ � ] 440 . [ � ].<br />

6.154 We believe that Sky has an incentive to restrict exploitation of these subscription VoD<br />

rights, in order to protect its own linear movie channels, which are the only means by<br />

which it can deliver movie content on its satellite platform. Furthermore, it appears to<br />

be acting on this incentive.<br />

Wholesale pricing of Core Premium channels<br />

Our views in September<br />

6.155 We noted in our Second <strong>Pay</strong> <strong>TV</strong> Consultation that the wholesale market power which<br />

we had identified might be exploited not only by restricting distribution of premium<br />

content, but also by setting high wholesale prices for that content. However, the<br />

evidence of high wholesale prices was not clear-cut. This is due to a variety of<br />

practical difficulties associated with an analysis of wholesale prices for content. We<br />

considered a range of evidence on both retail pricing and Sky’s profitability to<br />

address this question.<br />

6.156 We noted that when a seller of a product is in a position of market power, it can<br />

potentially set prices above competitive levels. Sky retails directly to around [ � ]%<br />

of subscribers to its Core Premium channels, and supplies the remaining [ � ]% at a<br />

wholesale price determined by a rate-card which we understand to be designed to<br />

give cable firms just enough margin – if they retail at the same price as Sky – for Sky<br />

to pass its interpretation of the OFT’s margin squeeze test (see paragraph 6.109).<br />

6.157 As such, Sky effectively controls the retail prices of its Core Premium channels. It can<br />

set its own retail prices at an optimal (profit maximising) level, and set its wholesale<br />

price to cable operators which will require them to charge the same or a similar price.<br />

The returns that cable firms can earn from retailing Sky’s Core Premium channels<br />

are constrained by the rate-card. If we were to consider Sky’s retail business as a<br />

purchaser of wholesale content at rate-card prices from its wholesale business, then<br />

this retail business would face the same constrained returns as a retailer. Under this<br />

interpretation, if Sky were to earn monopoly profits we would expect these to be<br />

extracted at the wholesale level.<br />

437 [ � ].<br />

438 [ � ]. Provided by Sky in response to information request of 14 May 2008.<br />

439 [ � ]. Provided by Virgin Media in response to information request of 23 May 2008.<br />

440 [ � ]. Ibid.<br />

211

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