Pay TV phase three document - Stakeholders - Ofcom
Pay TV phase three document - Stakeholders - Ofcom
Pay TV phase three document - Stakeholders - Ofcom
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<strong>Pay</strong> <strong>TV</strong> <strong>phase</strong> <strong>three</strong> <strong>document</strong> – non-confidential version<br />
156<br />
for all bundles). Virgin Media has not been able to negotiate a wholesale price<br />
that enables it to earn a higher margin on bundles including Sky Sports and/or<br />
Sky Movies. This indicates that Sky’s wholesale charges have not been<br />
effectively constrained by Virgin Media’s CBP.<br />
� Fifth, Sky’s vertical integration. In any negotiation, the strength of a party’s<br />
position depends on the negative consequences for it if it fails to strike a deal. As<br />
noted in paragraph 6.106, it is unclear whether a failure to reach a supply<br />
agreement with Virgin Media would be unprofitable for Sky, at least in the long<br />
term 305 . In any event, even if it is unprofitable for Sky to fail to supply Virgin<br />
Media, the costs to Sky will be partially mitigated by its vertical integration, since<br />
at least some Virgin Media subscribers will respond by switching to Sky’s retail<br />
business. This strengthens Sky’s position when dealing with Virgin Media.<br />
5.71 In relation to retailers other than those on cable, we are aware of several retailers<br />
that have sought wholesale access to Sky Sports and Sky Movies but have not been<br />
able to reach commercial agreements. This contrasts with the example of Setanta,<br />
which very quickly agreed wholesale deals with Virgin Media, BT Vision, Tiscali and<br />
Top Up <strong>TV</strong> 306 . We set out the evidence we have reviewed on these negotiations in<br />
section 6. We believe that the successive instances where commercial agreements<br />
have not been reached are at least indications that Sky does not consider these<br />
retailers to be essential outlets for its content. As such, we do not believe that these<br />
retailers would be able to exercise significant CBP with respect to Sky even if Sky<br />
were to wholesale Sky Sports to them.<br />
Conclusion on countervailing buyer power<br />
5.72 In summary, our view is that Virgin Media is the most likely retailer to exercise CBP<br />
over Sky. However, we believe that, while Virgin Media is a significant outlet for Sky,<br />
the commercial balance of the relationship appears to be strongly in favour of Sky.<br />
We therefore believe that no party exercises sufficient CBP to counter Sky’s seller<br />
power in the context of Core Premium Sports channels.<br />
Conclusion on the wholesale supply of Core Premium Sports channels<br />
5.73 In the light of Sky’s very high and sustained market shares, the existence of barriers<br />
to entry and limited prospects for CBP, we consider that Sky holds market power in<br />
the wholesale supply of Core Premium Sports channels. Even under the high<br />
threshold established under the Chapter II prohibition of CA98, we consider that Sky<br />
holds a dominant position, and that it is likely to be dominant for the next <strong>three</strong> to four<br />
years.<br />
Wholesale Core Premium Movie channels<br />
5.74 A summary of our assessment of market power in the wholesale supply of Core<br />
Premium Movie channels is set out below. First, a background section explains which<br />
channels lie within the relevant market, summarises our position in the Second <strong>Pay</strong><br />
305 Our Vertical Arithmetic analysis indicates that failing to reach a wholesale supply agreement with<br />
Virgin Media would be costly to Sky, relative to the current terms of supply. However, there is<br />
evidence that Sky weighs short-term revenue considerations against its strategic incentive to weaken<br />
or eliminate Virgin Media as a competitor.<br />
306 Setanta also has an exclusive wholesale agreement with Sky in respect of commercial customers.