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Pay TV phase three document - Stakeholders - Ofcom

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<strong>Pay</strong> <strong>TV</strong> <strong>phase</strong> <strong>three</strong> <strong>document</strong> – non-confidential version<br />

46<br />

� In relation to sport, the aggregation of the rights to specific sporting competitions<br />

by sporting bodies such as the FAPL, and the further aggregation by<br />

broadcasters such as Sky of the rights to different competitions.<br />

� In relation to movies, the aggregation by Sky of rights to show the movies from all<br />

six Major Hollywood Studios.<br />

3.40 To the extent that aggregation results in the creation of monopoly rents, these are<br />

likely to flow upstream to where the aggregation takes place. However, the existence<br />

of aggregation at different points in the value chain means that it is not always<br />

entirely clear who is likely to be the main beneficiary in practice of the aggregation<br />

process.<br />

� Sporting bodies such as the FAPL would be expected to retain any monopoly<br />

rents associated with the aggregation of rights for competitions for which they are<br />

responsible. However, some further aggregation of sports rights to different<br />

competitions is carried out by broadcasters such as Sky, and Sky may also have<br />

a degree of purchasing power because of its position in downstream markets,<br />

both of which might be expected to deliver some benefits to it.<br />

� Sky is likely to be the prime beneficiary of any monopoly rents arising from the<br />

aggregation of movie rights, due to its role as the principal aggregator. However,<br />

it is also likely that the Major Hollywood Studios can extract some of the benefit<br />

from aggregation in their individual negotiations with Sky.<br />

3.41 One important consequence of monopoly rents moving upstream is that it can<br />

become difficult to distinguish them from any scarcity rents associated with the<br />

‘talent’ which underpins the production of high quality content. In other words, the<br />

high salaries paid to some footballers and movie stars may be an indication of market<br />

power, but could equally well reflect the scarcity value of football skills and movie<br />

talent. This makes the precise identification of monopoly profits in content markets<br />

particularly difficult.<br />

Fixed costs of content production, and the importance of price discrimination<br />

3.42 Content markets have two important characteristics which in combination distinguish<br />

them from the markets for physical goods and services:<br />

� The consumption of content is non-rivalrous, in the sense that different<br />

consumers can consume the same piece of content at the same time. This<br />

means that the production costs of content can be regarded entirely as fixed<br />

costs, rather than varying with the number of consumers.<br />

� The fixed costs of producing certain categories of content can be high. For<br />

example, the wage costs alone of the FA Premier League were £1.2 billion in<br />

2007/2008 39 , while the average cost for making and marketing a single Hollywood<br />

film is about $100m 40 .<br />

39 According to Deloitte’s Annual Review of Football Finance 2009 -<br />

http://www.deloitte.com/dtt/cda/doc/content/UK_SBG_ARFF2009_Highlights.pdf, page 2.<br />

40 The MPAA’s Theatrical Market Statistics 2007 - http://www.mpaa.org/2007-US-Theatrical-Market-<br />

Statistics-Report.pdf, page 7.

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