Pay TV phase three document - Stakeholders - Ofcom
Pay TV phase three document - Stakeholders - Ofcom
Pay TV phase three document - Stakeholders - Ofcom
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<strong>Pay</strong> <strong>TV</strong> <strong>phase</strong> <strong>three</strong> <strong>document</strong> – non-confidential version<br />
252<br />
� It might be appropriate to extend the supply obligation to Sky’s own platform(s) if<br />
there was evidence that Sky was earning high retail margins, which might be<br />
reduced by stronger intra-platform competition. However, we do not have<br />
evidence that this is the case.<br />
� It might be appropriate to extend the supply obligation to Sky’s own platform(s) if<br />
there was evidence of a lack of retail innovation. Some such evidence does exist,<br />
in particular in relation to a lack of entry-level premium packages. However, it is<br />
likely that this specific concern can be remedied by a supply obligation on other<br />
platforms. DTT in particular is likely to be well-suited to the provision of new entry<br />
level premium packages.<br />
8.48 In addition to remedying the downstream effects of Sky’s market power, the<br />
wholesale supply obligation that we propose may provide a mechanism to make<br />
upstream rights markets more contestable, thereby reducing Sky’s market power at<br />
source. The reason for this is that access to a large subscriber base is likely to play a<br />
role in companies’ ability to bid successfully for content rights. This is essentially a<br />
‘ladder of investment’ argument. In order to maximise this effect, it might be<br />
appropriate to enable alternative retailers to retail Sky’s premium channels via Sky’s<br />
satellite platform(s), thereby gaining direct access to the [ � ] million subscribers on<br />
that platform. It might also be appropriate to enable alternative retailers to sell Sky’s<br />
premium channels to ‘pubs and clubs’ (see below).<br />
8.49 However, while we believe there is likely to be a relationship between subscriber<br />
base size and ability to bid for rights, this is only one factor influencing companies’<br />
ability to bid. Additionally, we believe it should be possible for alternative retailers to<br />
address Sky’s existing subscribers via other platforms, particularly those based on<br />
DTT (given the low switching costs associated with DTT).<br />
8.50 On balance we do not believe that an additional intervention associated with<br />
extending the obligation to Sky’s platform(s) would be appropriate for ensuring fair<br />
and effective competition.<br />
8.51 Note that in reaching this conclusion we do make a distinction between a ‘platform’<br />
and a ‘distribution technology’. Our proposed remedy applies to a variety of<br />
distribution technologies: cable, satellite, IP<strong>TV</strong>, DTT, mobile <strong>TV</strong>. There may then be<br />
several different ‘platforms’ on each distribution technology, each platform being<br />
defined by the set of conditional access technology and reception equipment that is<br />
particular to it.<br />
8.52 We do not propose to extend our proposed remedy to Sky’s platform(s), but we do<br />
propose that it should extend to other platforms using the same distribution<br />
technologies as Sky. For example, both Sky and Freesat operate satellite platforms,<br />
and our proposed remedy would apply to an alternative retailer on Freesat (obviously<br />
subject to that being part of Freesat’s strategy, and a suitable conditional access<br />
system being put in place).<br />
Should a must-offer apply for the purposes of onward retail to commercial<br />
premises?<br />
8.53 We proposed in our Second <strong>Pay</strong> <strong>TV</strong> Consultation not to apply a wholesale must-offer<br />
for onward retail to commercial premises, instead restricting the obligation to offer to<br />
retailers to residential customers.