31.01.2013 Views

Pay TV phase three document - Stakeholders - Ofcom

Pay TV phase three document - Stakeholders - Ofcom

Pay TV phase three document - Stakeholders - Ofcom

SHOW MORE
SHOW LESS

Create successful ePaper yourself

Turn your PDF publications into a flip-book with our unique Google optimized e-Paper software.

<strong>Pay</strong> <strong>TV</strong> <strong>phase</strong> <strong>three</strong> <strong>document</strong> – non-confidential version<br />

Section 8<br />

8 Remedies – channel distribution<br />

Summary<br />

8.1 We continue to believe that a wholesale must-offer remedy is an appropriate way of<br />

dealing with our concerns about the lack of fair and effective competition, stemming<br />

from Sky’s approach to the wholesale supply of Core Premium channels. There are<br />

various questions as to the right scope of this kind of remedy, which we address in<br />

this section. In particular, we believe we should set prices and other key terms for a<br />

wholesale must-offer. We propose to set prices on a retail-minus basis, although<br />

using cost-plus as a cross-check.<br />

8.2 Our current view is that it would not be more appropriate to proceed in relation to<br />

some or all of the matters in question under CA98. We welcome comments on that<br />

view.<br />

Introduction<br />

8.3 In section 6 we reached the view that as a result of Sky’s approach to the wholesale<br />

supply of Core Premium channels, there is not, and is not likely to be, fair and<br />

effective competition in the wholesale supply of Core Premium channels and the<br />

retail supply of bundles which include Core Premium channels.<br />

8.4 We identified a further concern that Sky might restrict the exploitation of content<br />

rights that it owns. Our specific concern related to SVoD rights. We return to this<br />

issue in section 12.<br />

8.5 We also identified a concern that market power at the wholesale level could result in<br />

high wholesale prices; the margin made as a result of those high prices might either<br />

go to Sky or upstream to rights holders. Our view based on Oxera’s analysis is that<br />

Sky is indeed making high wholesale margins.<br />

8.6 In section 7 we explained the adverse effect on consumers that we consider has<br />

resulted, and is likely to result, from Sky’s approach to the wholesale supply of Core<br />

Premium channels.<br />

8.7 In this section we consider, as required under s317(2), whether it would be more<br />

appropriate to proceed under CA98 than under s316. We then continue to consider<br />

what form of remedy (if any) might be imposed under s316 in order to ensure fair and<br />

effective competition so that we can address the adverse effects on consumers<br />

identified in section 7.<br />

8.8 In section 9 we set out various issues relating to the terms of a wholesale must-offer;<br />

this is focused on price, but also considers non-price-related issues such as security.<br />

8.9 In section 10 we consider whether a licence condition in the proposed form is<br />

proportionate by reference to the purpose of s316, and in light of our duties under<br />

CA03. That includes the carrying out of a full impact assessment. In section 11 we<br />

consult on the drafting of a proposed licence condition.<br />

8.10 Throughout these sections, we take into account consultation respondents’ views on<br />

our positions as set out in our Second <strong>Pay</strong> <strong>TV</strong> Consultation. We also take into<br />

244

Hooray! Your file is uploaded and ready to be published.

Saved successfully!

Ooh no, something went wrong!