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Pay TV phase three document - Stakeholders - Ofcom

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Section 7<br />

7 Consumer effects<br />

Summary<br />

<strong>Pay</strong> <strong>TV</strong> <strong>phase</strong> <strong>three</strong> <strong>document</strong> – non-confidential version<br />

7.1 We noted in our Second <strong>Pay</strong> <strong>TV</strong> Consultation that markets where competition is<br />

weak, and consumers are unable to exercise a real choice between suppliers, are<br />

unlikely to deliver the best outcomes for consumers. We set out several criteria<br />

against which we proposed to assess the operation of the market from a consumer<br />

perspective, focussing on choice, innovation and pricing. We use those criteria to<br />

consider the effect on consumers of the position that, as a result of Sky’s approach to<br />

the wholesale supply of Core Premium channels, there is not, and there is not likely<br />

to be, fair and effective competition.<br />

7.2 The most obvious manifestation of reduced consumer choice is the restricted<br />

availability of Sky’s premium content on other platforms. The fact that consumers on<br />

a number of platforms are currently either unable to access the most valuable sport<br />

and movie content, or face restricted access, is a source of concern.<br />

7.3 Those customers who most value premium content are more likely to have chosen<br />

Sky’s own satellite platform. This means that some consumers are likely to be on a<br />

platform which would not have been their first choice had premium content been<br />

equally available on all platforms.<br />

7.4 This creates a risk that existing platforms may not create new capabilities, and that<br />

new platforms may not emerge at all, because of a dependence on access to<br />

premium content. This dependence might either be direct (e.g. the dependence of<br />

IP<strong>TV</strong> services on certain VoD rights) or indirect (e.g. because new platforms cannot<br />

build sufficient scale without access to premium content). Either way, there is a risk<br />

that platform innovation will be reduced.<br />

7.5 These concerns are exacerbated as we look forward to the future; we are at a point<br />

where the potential choice of platforms is increasing, and is set to increase further.<br />

The chances of these options developing fully to the benefit of consumers are likely<br />

to be limited by the restricted availability of Core Premium channels. We consider on<br />

the basis of these effects that there is an adverse effect on the interests of<br />

consumers.<br />

7.6 The analysis which has been carried out by Oxera suggests that Sky is earning<br />

aggregate returns in excess of its cost of capital, implying retail prices that are above<br />

the competitive level.<br />

Introduction<br />

7.7 In this section we assess the likely effects on consumers of the competition concerns<br />

we identified in the previous section. This takes into consideration the historical<br />

development of pay <strong>TV</strong>, and the evidence that this provides to us, but also takes a<br />

forward looking view of the potential benefits to consumers associated with future<br />

developments.<br />

7.8 Our previous consultations set out criteria by which we would judge the performance<br />

of the market. We set out our views on consumer effects in light of these, which are<br />

as follows:<br />

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