The United States and China in Power Transition - Strategic Studies ...
The United States and China in Power Transition - Strategic Studies ...
The United States and China in Power Transition - Strategic Studies ...
Create successful ePaper yourself
Turn your PDF publications into a flip-book with our unique Google optimized e-Paper software.
on important issues of the day. Nevertheless, as Ch<strong>in</strong>ese<br />
Premier Wen Jiabao puts, “dialogue is better than<br />
confrontation.” 15 U.S. Secretary of State Cl<strong>in</strong>ton <strong>and</strong><br />
Treasury Secretary Geithner echo the Ch<strong>in</strong>ese Premier<br />
with a little strategic touch on the U.S.-<strong>Ch<strong>in</strong>a</strong> relationship:<br />
“Simply put, few global problems can be solved<br />
by the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> or <strong>Ch<strong>in</strong>a</strong> alone. And few can be<br />
solved without the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Ch<strong>in</strong>a</strong> together.”<br />
16 <strong>The</strong>se regular meet<strong>in</strong>gs will allow the two sides<br />
to “expla<strong>in</strong>” their positions on controversial issues, if<br />
not to solve them. <strong>The</strong>se deliberate efforts set the U.S.-<br />
<strong>Ch<strong>in</strong>a</strong> power transition apart from the past ones.<br />
In addition to these dialogues, <strong>Ch<strong>in</strong>a</strong> <strong>and</strong> the <strong>United</strong><br />
<strong>States</strong> have also established “hot l<strong>in</strong>es.” In February<br />
2008, the two sides signed an agreement to establish<br />
direct phone l<strong>in</strong>es between the Pentagon <strong>and</strong> Ch<strong>in</strong>ese<br />
Defense M<strong>in</strong>istry. 17 In April 2008, Ch<strong>in</strong>ese Defense<br />
M<strong>in</strong>ister Liang Guanglie <strong>and</strong> U.S. Defense Secretary<br />
Robert Gates made a 30-m<strong>in</strong>ute phone call. 18<br />
Third, the U.S. embracement of <strong>Ch<strong>in</strong>a</strong> as a responsible<br />
stakeholder opens the door for <strong>Ch<strong>in</strong>a</strong> to make<br />
changes to the exist<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>ternational system from<br />
with<strong>in</strong>, presumably through negotiation but not as a<br />
disgruntled revolutionary seek<strong>in</strong>g destruction of this<br />
system from outside. 19<br />
Fourth, although <strong>Ch<strong>in</strong>a</strong> wants to change the exist<strong>in</strong>g<br />
<strong>in</strong>ternational order, it does not have a sound alternative<br />
design to replace it. In recent years, <strong>Ch<strong>in</strong>a</strong><br />
has put forward a “harmonious world” construct as<br />
a Ch<strong>in</strong>ese vision for a new <strong>in</strong>ternational order. Yet as<br />
the analysis <strong>in</strong> the follow<strong>in</strong>g pages shows, this harmonious<br />
world construct does not measure up to a<br />
workable design for a new world order. It will help<br />
to improve the exist<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>ternational order <strong>and</strong> may<br />
“modify” U.S. <strong>in</strong>ternational conduct, but its imple-<br />
83