The United States and China in Power Transition - Strategic Studies ...

This combination of [PLA] rapidly advancing offensive
and defensive capabilities is beginning to raise
doubts in the region about America’s ability to defend
its allies and project its power. What is worse, over
the next several years there will be an increasing danger
that, in an extreme crisis, China’s leaders might
believe that they have a chance of starting a war by
effectively knocking the United States out of the Western
Pacific. . . . 83
Friedberg’s final remarks may be too alarming.
But China’s ambitions give the United States little
room for comfort. China wants to develop its maritime
power (海权), which covers, most importantly
but is not limited to, the security of China’s extended
ocean fronts and territorial waters, sovereign control
of Taiwan and its surrounding territory, “recovery”
of the “stolen” islands in the South and East China
Seas, 84 effective management of its claimed Exclusive
Economic Zone (EEZ), security of the sea lines of communication
(SLOC), and a powerful blue-water navy
that can project China’s power and protect China’s
expanding interests.
The Chinese believe that this maritime power is indispensible
for China to become a full-fledged global
power. 85 Currently, China has secured its extended
ocean fronts—no foreign power is to repeat a humiliating
invasion of China from the sea again. China has
also developed an increasingly credible deterrence
against Taiwan and possible U.S. military intervention
in an event of China-Taiwan confrontation over
unification or separation—with the access-denial capability
Friedberg has mentioned in the quote. 86 On
the distant SLOCs, China enjoys a free ride arguably
provided by the United States. But eventually, China
will prefer to rely on its own forces to protect its in-
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