- Page 1 and 2: U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE STRATEGIC STU
- Page 3 and 4: ***** Comments pertaining to this r
- Page 5 and 6: Appendix 1: Selected Articles From
- Page 7: with the United States? How does th
- Page 11 and 12: will take these two great powers ex
- Page 13 and 14: the social or economic system, of t
- Page 15 and 16: term remedy to this problem. As the
- Page 17 and 18: North Korea. This act should reliev
- Page 19 and 20: China Seas in peaceful ways? In add
- Page 22 and 23: CHAPTER 2 THE POWER TRANSITION THEO
- Page 24 and 25: and even territorial boundaries. Wa
- Page 26 and 27: challenge the Peloponnesian League
- Page 28 and 29: against all others on a yearly basi
- Page 30 and 31: Another Power Transition in the Mak
- Page 32 and 33: the “diffusion of power” to a l
- Page 34 and 35: sures in the 1990s and beyond, give
- Page 36 and 37: In addition, power transition, as d
- Page 38 and 39: percent of the world’s population
- Page 40 and 41: Brazil is blessed with an abundance
- Page 42 and 43: ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 2 1. A. F. K. Or
- Page 44 and 45: Uncertainty, and Major Power War, 1
- Page 46 and 47: CHAPTER 3 U.S.-CHINA POWER TRANSITI
- Page 48 and 49: China puts these issues behind, it
- Page 50 and 51: that had been going on for decades
- Page 52 and 53: of radical reformers under the lead
- Page 54 and 55: 4) let the nation debate this draft
- Page 56 and 57: 凯), a military strong man who con
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the barrel of a gun” and decided
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half a million individuals were rep
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and energy consumption, China ranks
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Moreover, China is also a record-ho
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prove the Chinese people’s standa
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motivation behind this U.S. engagem
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one was China’s subsequent move t
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threat” quickly became synonymic
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U.S./West’s primacy eroded, other
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the Chinese civilization) to 1911 (
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The George W. Bush administration,
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would be responsible to the world,
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11. Wang Zhaohui (王兆辉), “
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26. Recent studies show that Mao wa
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tagon Annual Report to Congress on
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2008, Yuan Peng (袁鹏) and Lin Ya
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analyses. Chinese analysts nowadays
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ise of the United States also spann
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Figure 4-1. U.S.-China Power Transi
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80 Table 4-1. China’s Modernizati
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Washington. In May 2010, Secretary
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mentation does not require a war wi
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Second, the United States will have
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In the post-Cold War era, the Unite
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they claim that as a “great and p
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order but not to understand it (民
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China’s modernization is a monume
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was in 2010. Chinese Premier Wen Ji
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In addition to the continuation of
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numerous attacks and intrusions on
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the CCP prevailed in replacing this
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The geographic location of Formosa
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The U.S. second take on the Taiwan
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Following the tenuous armistice in
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• to declare that peace and stabi
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documents have created no fewer pro
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voked China’s attack by pressing
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At the same time, Ma also made good
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By the early 1990s, with the vestig
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terests. At the moment, the most tr
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Further, we reject any nation’s a
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the United States, Britain, Austral
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well-equipped patrol ships and airp
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to maintain effective control or ma
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China could have demanded the “re
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of all of the Spratly islands. Its
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dealing with the other claimants. 1
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ary and Maritime Affairs. The PLAN
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himself as the “first Pacific Pre
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China opposed the United States sen
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delimitated by the 9 dashed border
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(尖阁群岛) in Japanese in the d
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Figure 4-5. China-Japan Disputes in
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and dynastic China’s envoys made
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is the true edge of the East China
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midable one in the coming years. Fu
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For a long time, the Chinese govern
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stand some Western scholars who try
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• Tibetans and Chinese each have
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The above-presented assertions, Chi
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transformation of the whole of Tibe
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the Dalai Lama’s request for the
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instance) and came up with document
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complicate the Tibet problem and lo
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The Uyghurs, who are the second lar
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Washington and they will lobby the
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more proactive than the tao-guang y
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Chinese analysts also agree with th
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• In September 2010, the China-Ja
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turns in the U.S.-China relations a
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States of China’s loosely-defined
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does not have an alternative region
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usiness is also a reflection of the
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Japan is equally firm on this dispu
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power and guns and to “mechanized
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has been a consistent assessment an
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Senior Colonel Zhao Xiaozuo (赵小
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ponents to U.S.-China military-to-m
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military activities in Chinese clai
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The United States has decades of ex
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pricious relations. Both understand
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ture; however, these conditions do
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13. 人民网 (People Net), “杨
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pher at his confirmation hearing,
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言’: 160年后要建立一个
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45. Ren Jiantao (任剑涛), a prof
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56. See Yan Jiaqi (严家琪), “
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76. See Shirley A. Kan, “Taiwan:
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86. See Marshall Hoyler, “China
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98. Luo Yuan (罗援), “中国有
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Hague Court Reports 2d 83 [1932] [P
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辉), “军情观察:中国主权
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美国因素及其影响” (“The
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整” (“‘Return’ or ‘Repos
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146. China, Law on the Exclusive Ec
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Edge Vessels and Makes Regular Patr
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174. The Central Tibetan Administra
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Institute [Philosophy and Social Sc
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196. There is dispute, however, abo
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strong advocates. They projected th
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Communist Party of China, June 4, 1
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238. “U.S. Blocks Taiwan’s F-16
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fiscal, immigration or sanitary law
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laying of submarine cables and pipe
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Notwithstanding the provisions of p
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Article 79: Submarine Cables and Pi
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Article 83: Delimitation of the Con
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Article 89: Invalidity of Claims of
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ENDNOTE - APPENDIX 2 1. Released to
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annihilation, or whether she will f
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APPENDIX 4 TREATY OF PEACE WITH JAP
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APPENDIX 5 TREATY OF PEACE BETWEEN
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U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE STRATEGIC STU