The United States and China in Power Transition - Strategic Studies ...
The United States and China in Power Transition - Strategic Studies ...
The United States and China in Power Transition - Strategic Studies ...
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Follow<strong>in</strong>g the tenuous armistice <strong>in</strong> 1953, the <strong>United</strong><br />
<strong>States</strong> turned around to sign a Mutual Defense Treaty<br />
with the Republic of <strong>Ch<strong>in</strong>a</strong> (ROC) government on Taiwan,<br />
turn<strong>in</strong>g the Seventh Fleet’s temporary patroll<strong>in</strong>g<br />
<strong>in</strong>to a long-term U.S. commitment to the defense of<br />
Taiwan. 69 This pact effectively put Taiwan out of reach<br />
by the ma<strong>in</strong>l<strong>and</strong> Ch<strong>in</strong>ese for the next 20 years.<br />
<strong>The</strong> next time the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> dealt with the Taiwan<br />
issue was <strong>in</strong> 1972 when President Richard Nixon<br />
made his historic visit to <strong>Ch<strong>in</strong>a</strong>. Nixon was there to<br />
change U.S.-<strong>Ch<strong>in</strong>a</strong> relations <strong>and</strong> solicit <strong>Ch<strong>in</strong>a</strong>’s cooperation<br />
<strong>in</strong> end<strong>in</strong>g the Vietnam War <strong>and</strong> counterbalanc<strong>in</strong>g<br />
the Soviet threat. <strong>The</strong> Ch<strong>in</strong>ese leaders took<br />
the opportunity to address the Taiwan issue. It was a<br />
tough bus<strong>in</strong>ess. 70 <strong>The</strong> two sides expressed their positions<br />
<strong>in</strong> the Shanghai Communiqué, which turned out<br />
to be a masterpiece of diplomatic communication <strong>in</strong><br />
modern <strong>in</strong>ternational relations known as the “agreement<br />
to disagree,” as the follow<strong>in</strong>g:<br />
• <strong>The</strong> Ch<strong>in</strong>ese side reaffirmed its position: the Taiwan<br />
question is the crucial question obstruct<strong>in</strong>g<br />
the normalization of relations between <strong>Ch<strong>in</strong>a</strong><br />
<strong>and</strong> the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong>; the Government of<br />
the PRC is the sole legal government of <strong>Ch<strong>in</strong>a</strong>;<br />
Taiwan is a prov<strong>in</strong>ce of <strong>Ch<strong>in</strong>a</strong> which has long<br />
been returned to the motherl<strong>and</strong>; the liberation<br />
of Taiwan is <strong>Ch<strong>in</strong>a</strong>’s <strong>in</strong>ternal affair <strong>in</strong> which no<br />
other country has the right to <strong>in</strong>terfere; <strong>and</strong> all<br />
U.S. forces <strong>and</strong> military <strong>in</strong>stallations must be<br />
withdrawn from Taiwan. <strong>The</strong> Ch<strong>in</strong>ese Government<br />
firmly opposes any activities which aim<br />
at the creation of “one <strong>Ch<strong>in</strong>a</strong>, one Taiwan,”<br />
“one <strong>Ch<strong>in</strong>a</strong>, two governments,” “two <strong>Ch<strong>in</strong>a</strong>s,”<br />
an “<strong>in</strong>dependent Taiwan” or advocate that “the<br />
status of Taiwan rema<strong>in</strong>s to be determ<strong>in</strong>ed.”<br />
108