The United States and China in Power Transition - Strategic Studies ...

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provocative acts, adamantly opposes the U.S. military posturing in the Korean Peninsula, charging that the real intent of the intensified U.S. military activities in Northeast Asia is a U.S. attempt to deter China. As recently as June 2011, China solicited Russia’s support to issue a joint statement openly denouncing the U.S. approach: “the two countries pledged support for each other on a wide range of issues, including Russia’s security challenges from the United States and Europe as well as U.S. pressure on China in the Asia-Pacific regions.” 2 U.S. political and military leaders should see that, with China and Russia standing in the way, a military solution to the North Korea problem is not an option. Hasty military reactions to the North Korea problem are increasingly becoming a point of contention between China and the United States. This is dangerous to the power transition process. • In light of this situation, the U.S. repositioning and reduction of military forces in South Korea appeared to be proper policy adjustments. In the years ahead, the United States should gradually turn the remaining U.S. military forces in the Korean Peninsula from the decades-long tactical operations into a strategic deterrence presence. This adjustment is consistent with the Nixon Doctrine that expects our allies and friendly nations in Asia to bear the primary responsibility for their security interests, while the United States provides needed military, economic, and political support. In the meantime, the United States should take China’s advice to replace the Korean War Armistice with a peace treaty and normalize U.S. relations with xv
North Korea. This act should relieve the United States from a hostile problem that has cost the United States blood and treasure for well over 6 decades. With the removal of hostility, North Korea has no more excuse to develop nuclear weapons. The United States is no longer part of the problem. The eventual denuclearization in North Korea, which is a China-led principle and initiative, will be an issue of the Northeast Asia nations. The United States can reengage in this issue as an “off-shore balancer” 3 with much strategic flexibility. • In the next 30 years, the gap between the U.S. and Chinese comprehensive national power will continue to exist, but it will become smaller. The power transition theory believes that the risk of war will become bigger when the two nations’ national power approaches parity. U.S. and Chinese leaders must pay more attention to the changes coming out of the power transition in the years ahead and make more efforts to manage the changes accordingly. ENDNOTES - SUMMARY 1. Dong Feng (董风), “中美军事关系究竟怎么了” (“What Is the Matter with the U.S.-China Military Relations?”) 世界知识 (World Affairs), No. 13, 2010. 2. Wu Jiao, “New Era for Sino-Russian Ties: Joint Declaration Pledges Mutual Support on Key Security Issues,” China Daily, June 17, 2011. 3. See Christopher Lane’s works for the idea of the United States as an off-shore balancer. xvi
Page 1 and 2: U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE STRATEGIC STU
Page 3 and 4: ***** Comments pertaining to this r
Page 5 and 6: Appendix 1: Selected Articles From
Page 7 and 8: with the United States? How does th
Page 10 and 11: SUMMARY This analysis discusses the
Page 12 and 13: and unexpected challenges. U.S. and
Page 14 and 15: ahead, while the United States shou
Page 18 and 19: CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION We can’t p
Page 20: Finally, the next 30 years will be
Page 23 and 24: Figure 2-1. Structure of Internatio
Page 25 and 26: As a general rule, mature nations m
Page 27 and 28: centuries, periodic internal breaku
Page 29 and 30: However, British power gradually de
Page 31 and 32: aftermath of World War I. President
Page 33 and 34: In retrospect, we can make the argu
Page 35 and 36: malized” Japan (presumably so wit
Page 37 and 38: and China. For centuries, China as
Page 39 and 40: expansion. Russia is not happy with
Page 41 and 42: dissatisfied second-ranked power. I
Page 43 and 44: danger of war because the condition
Page 45 and 46: 21. See a recent analysis of Russia
Page 47 and 48: In the face of these daunting chall
Page 49 and 50: West. This sentiment runs deep and
Page 51 and 52: the changes to China appear nonthre
Page 53 and 54: Unfortunately, the emperor and the
Page 55 and 56: the Qing started to rock the dynast
Page 57 and 58: In October 1928, the ROC government
Page 59 and 60: were confident and eager to unleash
Page 61 and 62: those so-called “leaders of capit
Page 63 and 64: Figure 3-3. Top Iron/Steel Producti
Page 65 and 66: system modernization (although the
Page 67 and 68:
cieties, penetrating into economics
Page 69 and 70:
Just as the world was experiencing
Page 71 and 72:
The Coming Conflict with China was
Page 73 and 74:
from the Chinese point of view, the
Page 75 and 76:
States in particular (the Chinese E
Page 77 and 78:
now willingly to become a member of
Page 79 and 80:
coincidence of interests is a matte
Page 81 and 82:
Chinese way of thinking to encourag
Page 83 and 84:
18. Warlords such as Feng Guozhang
Page 85 and 86:
31. See, for example, the United Na
Page 87 and 88:
Mearsheimer’s Presentation at Sha
Page 89 and 90:
58. Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao deli
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CHAPTER 4 THE FUTURE OF U.S.-CHINA
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the significance of their ambitions
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ical, economic, security, and cultu
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POSSIBLE OUTCOMES FOR THE U.S.-CHIN
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on important issues of the day. Nev
Page 102 and 103:
A Change of Guard? The peaceful cha
Page 104 and 105:
The U.S. push for democratic change
Page 106 and 107:
opposed Soviet hegemony over the co
Page 108 and 109:
However, the harmonious world const
Page 110 and 111:
cover for the Chinese leaders to pr
Page 112 and 113:
sonable demands. The CCP, after all
Page 114 and 115:
United States stands for the democr
Page 116 and 117:
to overstep on each other’s inter
Page 118 and 119:
stated in the treaty “with satisf
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of war reparation to Japan followin
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cultural, and historical interests.
Page 124 and 125:
version to conquer independent nati
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• The U.S. side declared: The Uni
Page 128 and 129:
malization of relations with the Un
Page 130 and 131:
the “One-China” principle, whic
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ment. The KMT’s landslide victori
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ing. As China becomes more powerful
Page 136 and 137:
This combination of [PLA] rapidly a
Page 138 and 139:
U.S. aircraft carrier group making
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earlier, it has been conducting thi
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the planned war games, many took th
Page 144 and 145:
field Bank (中沙群岛) in the mi
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to accept the territorial “spoils
Page 148 and 149:
littoral nations to claim the 200 n
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neighbors, especially the Southeast
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sertive measures to settle the disp
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Philippines’ claimed South China
Page 156 and 157:
Asian Affairs at the National Secur
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audience (there were 27 of them at
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15th anniversary of the U.S.-Vietna
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compromised by recommending claiman
Page 164 and 165:
Indeed, the current fight over thes
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and the handover of those islands t
Page 168 and 169:
for ruling on maritime disputes: on
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Han Chinese, the ones in Tibet and
Page 172 and 173:
Development takes time. Between now
Page 174 and 175:
• During the Qing Dynasty, the ce
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was erected at the Tibet-China bord
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• In October 1950, the newly-foun
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Deputy Director of the CCP’s Cent
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a statutory position of Special Coo
Page 184 and 185:
equivocally that he does not seek s
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the Chinese, Mongols, and the Turki
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大会 or 世维会). It is an inte
Page 190 and 191:
U.S.-CHINA POWER TRANSITION: AT ODD
Page 192 and 193:
way China develops, and guard again
Page 194 and 195:
• In March 2010, the U.S. State D
Page 196 and 197:
Specifically, they pressed the Chin
Page 198 and 199:
on China on democratic change, dead
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Will China follow the example of U.
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China power transition were to end
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the arms sales business. For all th
Page 206 and 207:
no substitute for the efforts to wi
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With an adjustment in its national
Page 210 and 211:
In addition to these quantitative c
Page 212 and 213:
other items to China that still rem
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ment and containment, with ample ev
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un, this kind of relationship is no
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U.S.-China power transition is a lo
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a preventive war launched by the do
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look Database, April 2010). The Wor
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ary 2006, for a discussion of China
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Chinese critiques of the harmonious
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Rule by Virtue”), 刊授党校,
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year term in prison for what he sai
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66. Dwight D. Eisenhower, The White
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80. See PRC position on this issue
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Xinhua News Agency, March 11, 2009;
Page 238 and 239:
The delegates rejected the Soviet a
Page 240 and 241:
York: Metheun, 1982; Li Jinming (
Page 242 and 243:
the Mischief Reef and Deploying Fig
Page 244 and 245:
“Hearing on Maritime Territorial
Page 246 and 247:
the Persian Gulf region will be reg
Page 248 and 249:
our alliance responsibilities,” q
Page 250 and 251:
169. See also Wangchuk Deden Shakab
Page 252 and 253:
Gyaltsen Gyari, “The Way Forward
Page 254 and 255:
190. The Central Tibetan Administra
Page 256 and 257:
203. The highest-ranking Chinese of
Page 258 and 259:
213. Henry Kissinger, On China, New
Page 260 and 261:
232. See Shirley Kan, “U.S.-China
Page 262 and 263:
APPENDIX 1 SELECTED ARTICLES FROM T
Page 264 and 265:
other activities for the economic e
Page 266 and 267:
The continental margin comprises th
Page 268 and 269:
Article 77: Rights of the Coastal S
Page 270 and 271:
Article 81: Drilling on the Contine
Page 272 and 273:
State, or in the archipelagic water
Page 274 and 275:
APPENDIX 2 CAIRO DECLARATION 1 Conf
Page 276 and 277:
APPENDIX 3 POTSDAM PROCLAMATION 1 D
Page 278:
Japan shall be permitted to maintai
Page 281 and 282:
Article 3: Japan will concur in any
Page 283 and 284:
U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE Major General
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