The United States and China in Power Transition - Strategic Studies ...

malization of relations with the United States in 1979,
China sought to put an end to it. In 1982, China got
the Ronald Reagan administration to issue the third
joint U.S.-China communiqué to address the arms
sales issue. Yet it was a noncommittal promise from
the United States:
The United States Government states that it does not
seek to carry out a long-term policy of arms sales to
Taiwan, that its arms sales to Taiwan will not exceed,
either in qualitative or in quantitative terms, the level
of those supplied in recent years since the establishment
of diplomatic relations between the United States
and China, and that it intends to reduce gradually its
sales of arms to Taiwan, leading over a period of time
to a final resolution. In so stating, the United States
acknowledges China’s consistent position regarding
the thorough settlement of this issue. 74
While negotiating with the Chinese, the Reagan
administration privately provided six assurances to
Taiwan that the United States 1) had not agreed to
set a date for ending arms sales; 2) had not agreed to
hold prior consultations with the PRC regarding arms
sales to Taiwan; 3) would not play a mediation role
between the PRC and ROC; 4) would not revise the
TRA; 5) had not altered its position regarding sovereignty
over Taiwan; and 6) would not exert pressure
on Taiwan to enter into negotiation with the PRC. 75
For better or for worse, the Shanghai Communiqué
of 1972, the Joint Communiqué to establish U.S.-
China diplomatic relations of 1979, the Joint Communiqué
on Arms Sales to Taiwan of 1982, and the
Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) of 1979 have become the
basic documents “governing” the relations among
China, Taiwan, and the United States. However, these
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