The United States and China in Power Transition - Strategic Studies ...

66. Dwight D. Eisenhower, The White House Years: Mandate
and Change, 1953-1956, Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Company,
Inc., 1963, p. 463.
67. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles later went on record
to make clear the U.S. change on its position. Dulles stated that
“technical sovereignty over Formosa and the Pescadores has never
been settled” and that “the future title is not determined by the
Japanese peace treaty [with the United Nations in 1951], nor is
it determined by the peace treaty which was concluded between
the Republic of China and Japan [in 1952],” Foreign Relations of the
United States, 1954.
68. Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Harry S.
Truman, 1950, p. 527.
69. Statement by Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, Foreign
Relations of the United States, Vol. VI, p. xx.
70. See Henry Kissinger’s accounts of the painstaking negotiations
with the Chinese on the Taiwan issues in “The Beijing-
Washington Back-Channel and Henry Kissinger’s Secret Trip to
China, September 1970-July 1971,” National Security Archive
Electronic Briefing Book No. 66, William Burr, ed., available from
the National Security Archive Website.
71. Joint Communiqué of the United States of America and the
People’s Republic of China (the Shanghai Communiqué), February 28,
1972.
72. See President Carter’s writings for his decision to normalize
relations with China at the time.
73. The Taiwan Relations Act, U.S. Public Law 96-8, 1979.
74. “U.S.-China Joint Communiqué of August 17, 1982,” The
Department of State Bulletin, October 1982.
75. See Harvey Feldman, “President Reagan’s Six Assurances
to Taiwan and Their Meaning Today,” The Heritage Foundation
WebMemo, No. 1653, October 2, 2007.
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