The United States and China in Power Transition - Strategic Studies ...

Will China follow the example of U.S. President James
Monroe (the 5th President from 1817 to 1825) and assert
a sphere of influence in East and Southeast Asia?
Will the rise of China come at the expense of U.S. core
interests in this region?
These questions are understandable, but the concerns
are not necessary for at least three main reasons.
First, the Chinese know that it is not practical.
Dai Bingguo ridiculed the idea of a Chinese version
of Monroe Doctrine in his remarks mentioned earlier.
Indeed, in the next 30 years, China still needs to carefully
handle relations with its Asian neighbors so that
China can continue its modernization mission, rather
than trying to become a “boss” in this region.
Second, the nations in Asia will not accept a Chinese
Monroe Doctrine either. Unlike the weak nations
in Central and South America of President Monroe’s
time, many of China’s Asian neighbors are formidable
powers. Japan, in particular, is not quite ready to yield
its leading position in Asia to China yet. Of note is
that almost all of the East and Southeast Asian nations
want the United States to stay engaged in this region.
It is a widely-shared view that the nations in Asia-Pacific
want the United States to maintain security and
order in this region and serve as a countermeasure
against China. 216
Finally, the U.S. alliance and coalition network in
the Western Pacific is solid. It is stable and powerful
enough to maintain the U.S.-led regional order in the
years to come. China is understandably uncomfortable
with this U.S.-led “encirclement;” but it has no reason
to be paranoid. The U.S. effort is part of its “hedging”
strategy to guard against a China that might turn aggressive,
but not a strategy to contain or attack China.
China can use its economic power to attract the
Asian nations. But China should bear in mind that it
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