The United States and China in Power Transition - Strategic Studies ...

for ruling on maritime disputes: one is to see if you
have effective control and management of the disputed
territory; and the other is the preference of effective
control over historical claims. For instance, we have
been arguing that these islands have been ours since
antiquity; these words are hollow; what really counts
is your actual control and effective management. China’s
marine surveillance and law enforcement patrol
must make its presence in the disputed area and establish
records of effective control.” 156
Sun’s remarks are China’s battle cry. China’s actions
are already underway. The Chinese SOA made
the debut of its control and administration mission
on the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands in December 2008.
The Chinese celebrated this first successful operation.
Two Chinese marine surveillance and law enforcement
vessels caught the Japanese defense force off
guard. They broke into the Japanese-guarded 12 nm
zone around the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands and stayed
there for about 8 hours. 157 A Chinese Foreign Ministry
spokesman dismissed Japan’s protest, saying that
“China does not see its normal surveillance and law
enforcement activities in its maritime territory ‘provocative;’
and China will decide when to send these
vessels to the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands again on its
own terms.” 158 Since then, China’s marine surveillance
ships have made many more “visits” to the Diaoyu/
Senkaku Islands. The SOA has stated that it would
turn these “visits” into regular official duties (常态化
定期巡航) for the Marine Surveillance Fleet. 159
The Chinese have noted that at this point that its
marine surveillance and law enforcement fleet is still
much smaller than that of Japan. The Chinese government
has specified in its recently released 12th
Five-Year Plan that it would turn this force into a for-
151