The United States and China in Power Transition - Strategic Studies ...

mentation does not require a war with the United
States or the destruction of the U.S.-led international
system.
Finally, the power transition theory points out that
“a wise challenger, growing in power through internal
development, would wait to threaten the existing international
order until it was as powerful as the dominant
nation and its allies, for surely it would seem
foolish to attack while weaker than the enemy.” 20 A recent
excellent analysis of the power transition theory
reinforces this view by showing convincingly that the
upstart, believing its development would eventually
turn it into the “top dog” among the great powers,
would try to avoid premature confrontation, even as
it approaches parity, with the hegemon. 21 It is more
logical, and empirically evident, that the dominant
power rather than the upstart is more likely to initiate
a fight. This is clearly the case with China, whose
leaders have sworn to use strategy rather than force to
win the contest.
In addition, as two well-established nuclear powers
and extensively-connected economic growth engines,
a calculated war between the United States and
China is unthinkable (even Mearsheimer has to accept
this). Thus, with the United States expected to uphold
its military superiority well into the mid-century, the
possibility of China using force to change the world
(replacing the U.S. presence everywhere) is highly
unlikely. Deadly contest for change is not an option
for China. The risk of war between the United States
and China will be more likely a miscalculated or unwanted
fight over China’s unsettled problems in the
Western Pacific (more discussion of this aspect in the
following pages).
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