The United States and China in Power Transition - Strategic Studies ...

coincidence of interests is a matter of convenience. But
“[r]elationships built on shared interest and values are
deep and lasting. We can cooperate with the emerging
China of today, even as we work for the democratic
China of tomorrow.” 61 China’s peaceful rise would be
possible only with its genuine internal transformation
and external cooperation.
The Chinese took the U.S. response with much
caution. On the one hand, they believed that it was
a reluctant acceptance of China’s growing power and
international influence. On the other, the Chinese saw
that the “responsible stakeholder” designation had
many hidden agendas and trappings against China.
First, it was a U.S. hegemonic design to incorporate
China into the U.S. “orbit.” The United States would
expect China to follow the rules set by the United
States and the West. The latter would be the judge
for China’s acts. Second, the range of responsibilities
would be beyond China’s ability. Third, it was an attempt
to get China to share the U.S. hegemonic burdens,
many of which were against China’s moral principles
and national interests. Fourth, it was a different
way to blame China for those China-threat problems
such as rising costs for energy and other national resources,
environmental degradation, climate change,
and many others, and asked China to bear more responsibility
for those global problems. 62
Chinese analysts nevertheless noted the positive
side of the U.S. response—it was one that sought cooperation
rather than confrontation. However, they all
called for the Chinese leaders to stand firm on China’s
long-held independent foreign policy, take on responsibilities
according to China’s ability, moral principles,
and national interests, even if they were in conflict
with those of the United States and the West. China
62