The United States and China in Power Transition - Strategic Studies ...

China could have demanded the “return” of the South
China Sea islands in the Cairo Declaration. Indeed, the
United States, the UK, and China were the only three
“Great Allied Powers” gathering in Cairo to map out
the post-war East Asia territorial rearrangement (Vietnam,
Malaysia, and the Philippines were not even independent
countries yet). Moreover, in 1946, the ROC
government dispatched warships to “recover” the
Paracel and Spratly islands. 107 In a world that emphasized
effective control rather than historical claims, 108
China could have kept its troops there to exercise
effective control of those territories and establish
China’s unbroken and unchallengeable possession of
those islands. Chinese leaders are themselves to blame
for failing to do so and neglecting the South China Sea
Islands for decades thereafter. 109 Their repeated protests
against the United States and the other claimants
and their statements about the South China Sea Islands
“historically belonging to China (自古以来属于
中国),” or as “China’s intrinsic and inseparable territories
(中国固有和不可分割的领土),” although necessary
for China to uphold its claims, sounded painfully
hollow. 110 Chinese leaders wasted all their time and
energy engaging the Chinese in “perpetual revolution
and class struggle (继续革命与阶级斗争)” against each
other at home, while leaving the disputed territories
unattended offshore.
In the meantime, Vietnam and the Philippines
continued their efforts (in acts, not only in words) to
secure their claims and exercise effective control over
the South China Sea islands. 111 By the early 1970s,
word came that the South and East China Seas had
vast deposits of fossil fuel and natural gas. The negotiation
of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea
was also making progress—the world would soon
divide up the “ocean commons” and allow the ocean
130