The United States and China in Power Transition - Strategic Studies ...
The United States and China in Power Transition - Strategic Studies ...
The United States and China in Power Transition - Strategic Studies ...
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the arms sales bus<strong>in</strong>ess. For all the years s<strong>in</strong>ce then,<br />
<strong>Ch<strong>in</strong>a</strong> has tried to hold the President accountable to<br />
the 1982 agreement. Unfortunately, as the say<strong>in</strong>g goes,<br />
<strong>Ch<strong>in</strong>a</strong> has been bark<strong>in</strong>g up the wrong tree. In practical<br />
terms, <strong>Ch<strong>in</strong>a</strong> should f<strong>in</strong>d it easier to persuade Taiwan<br />
to give up its needs than to get the U.S. Congress to<br />
amend or abolish the TRA.<br />
<strong>Ch<strong>in</strong>a</strong> may dismiss all of the above <strong>and</strong> prepare to<br />
take stronger actions if the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> were to authorize<br />
another sale of arms to Taiwan. However, <strong>Ch<strong>in</strong>a</strong><br />
should learn the lessons from their last two unproductive<br />
reactions. <strong>The</strong> suspension of military exchanges<br />
hurt both sides <strong>and</strong> had to be resumed eventually. A<br />
more measured approach should be considered.<br />
On the South <strong>Ch<strong>in</strong>a</strong> Sea Disputes. <strong>The</strong> hot-tempered<br />
exchange between Secretary of State Cl<strong>in</strong>ton <strong>and</strong> Ch<strong>in</strong>ese<br />
Foreign M<strong>in</strong>ister Yang Jiechi is a good example<br />
of the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Ch<strong>in</strong>a</strong> overreact<strong>in</strong>g to each<br />
other’s moves. A high degree of distrust between the<br />
two sides regard<strong>in</strong>g each other’s <strong>in</strong>tentions <strong>and</strong> approaches<br />
toward the South <strong>Ch<strong>in</strong>a</strong> Sea problems certa<strong>in</strong>ly<br />
made the situation worse.<br />
Aside from the above, the Ch<strong>in</strong>ese strongly hold<br />
that if Secretary Cl<strong>in</strong>ton did not disregard <strong>Ch<strong>in</strong>a</strong>’s private<br />
request for her not to br<strong>in</strong>g the difference between<br />
<strong>Ch<strong>in</strong>a</strong> <strong>and</strong> the <strong>United</strong> <strong>States</strong> over the South <strong>Ch<strong>in</strong>a</strong> Sea<br />
issues to the floor of the ASEAN Regional Forum <strong>and</strong><br />
make <strong>Ch<strong>in</strong>a</strong> lose face <strong>in</strong> front of so many foreign m<strong>in</strong>isters<br />
of the Asia Pacific region, <strong>Ch<strong>in</strong>a</strong> would not have<br />
had to react so strongly. 218 It appears that be<strong>in</strong>g a little<br />
culturally sensitive <strong>and</strong> considerate when deal<strong>in</strong>g<br />
with <strong>Ch<strong>in</strong>a</strong> can be more productive.<br />
On the <strong>Ch<strong>in</strong>a</strong>-Japan Dispute <strong>in</strong> the East <strong>Ch<strong>in</strong>a</strong> Sea.<br />
<strong>Ch<strong>in</strong>a</strong> has set itself on a path of no-return on the dispute<br />
over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Isl<strong>and</strong>s. It is a matter<br />
of when <strong>and</strong> how <strong>Ch<strong>in</strong>a</strong> settles the issue with Japan. 219<br />
187