The United States and China in Power Transition - Strategic Studies ...

the “One-China” principle, which is China’s moststressed
item, is not a treaty-bound U.S. commitment
at all. The Taiwan Relations Act of 1979, however, is
a U.S. public law. No matter how strongly China opposes
it, every U.S. President has to follow the law to
handle U.S. relations with Taiwan, whether they like
it or not.
Moreover, there is plenty of ambiguity in those
documents. Taiwan’s pro-independence forces look
to the TRA as their source of U.S. support because of
its strong pro-Taiwan positions and push the Taiwan
independence agenda to the brink from time to time
with the expectation that the United States will eventually
back them up.
China, however, insists that the United States
would honor the One-China principle and reacts
strongly to Taiwan’s pro-independence moves with
the expectation that the United States will not intervene.
The United States for some time relied on this
“strategic ambiguity” to maintain a delicate balance
between the two sides across the Taiwan Strait. However,
the recurrent tension in this area has forced the
United States to rush to the rescue from time to time.
This so-called strategic ambiguity eventually fell out
of favor during George W. Bush’s terms in the White
House. In 2001, in the aftermath of the U.S.-China
military airplane collision incident, President Bush
categorically put it that “the United States would do
whatever it takes to help Taiwan defend itself.” 78 Yet
in 2003, the President, while having a meeting with
the Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao at the White House,
responded to a question from the press that he would
not want Taiwan to make trouble. 79 In other words,
the United States made it clear that if Taiwan pro-
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