The United States and China in Power Transition - Strategic Studies ...

voked China’s attack by pressing the independence
agenda, it should not expect the United States to come
to its defense; but if China lost its patience and forced
unification upon Taiwan, the United States would intervene.
Strategically, President Bush had in essence
removed all the ambiguities in the U.S. commitment.
Operationally, the U.S. response will depend on how
the situation goes.
In the course of its development, the Taiwan issue
has become a bizarre tug of war. On one end of the
rope stands China, determined, focused, and making
every effort to pull Taiwan into its fold. On the other
end of the rope, there are two disoriented contestants,
Taiwan and the United States, each having an internal
tug of war over the China-Taiwan issue.
Inside Taiwan, it is a three-way situation. The DPP
tries to pull Taiwan away from China. The Kuomintang
(KMT) stands for eventual unification of Taiwan
with China, not on China’s terms, but on democratic
principles—China must become a democracy or the
KMT will not lead Taiwan to join China.
The 23 million Taiwan people are torn between
these two parties. Repeated public opinion polls in Taiwan
show that except for a small percentage of steadfast
pro-independence and pro-unification extremes,
most people have to agree that the current status quo
of de facto but not de jure independence is a choice of
the lesser evil, because they understand that outright
promotion of formal Taiwan independence will provoke
a war with China, whereas a compromised unification
at this time is asking for trouble. Why submit
to an authoritarian regime in Beijing while they can
enjoy democracy and freedom in Taiwan?
The tug of war took a dramatic turn in 2008 when
the KMT regained control of the Taiwan govern-
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