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U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE STRATEGIC STU
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***** Comments pertaining to this r
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Appendix 1: Selected Articles From
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with the United States? How does th
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SUMMARY This analysis discusses the
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and unexpected challenges. U.S. and
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ahead, while the United States shou
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provocative acts, adamantly opposes
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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION We can’t p
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Finally, the next 30 years will be
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Figure 2-1. Structure of Internatio
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As a general rule, mature nations m
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centuries, periodic internal breaku
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However, British power gradually de
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aftermath of World War I. President
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In retrospect, we can make the argu
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malized” Japan (presumably so wit
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and China. For centuries, China as
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expansion. Russia is not happy with
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dissatisfied second-ranked power. I
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danger of war because the condition
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21. See a recent analysis of Russia
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In the face of these daunting chall
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West. This sentiment runs deep and
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the changes to China appear nonthre
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Unfortunately, the emperor and the
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the Qing started to rock the dynast
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In October 1928, the ROC government
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were confident and eager to unleash
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those so-called “leaders of capit
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Figure 3-3. Top Iron/Steel Producti
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system modernization (although the
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cieties, penetrating into economics
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Just as the world was experiencing
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The Coming Conflict with China was
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from the Chinese point of view, the
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States in particular (the Chinese E
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now willingly to become a member of
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coincidence of interests is a matte
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Chinese way of thinking to encourag
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18. Warlords such as Feng Guozhang
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31. See, for example, the United Na
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Mearsheimer’s Presentation at Sha
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58. Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao deli
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CHAPTER 4 THE FUTURE OF U.S.-CHINA
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the significance of their ambitions
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ical, economic, security, and cultu
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POSSIBLE OUTCOMES FOR THE U.S.-CHIN
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on important issues of the day. Nev
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A Change of Guard? The peaceful cha
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The U.S. push for democratic change
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opposed Soviet hegemony over the co
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However, the harmonious world const
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cover for the Chinese leaders to pr
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sonable demands. The CCP, after all
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United States stands for the democr
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to overstep on each other’s inter
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stated in the treaty “with satisf
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of war reparation to Japan followin
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cultural, and historical interests.
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version to conquer independent nati
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• The U.S. side declared: The Uni
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malization of relations with the Un
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the “One-China” principle, whic
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ment. The KMT’s landslide victori
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ing. As China becomes more powerful
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This combination of [PLA] rapidly a
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U.S. aircraft carrier group making
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earlier, it has been conducting thi
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the planned war games, many took th
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field Bank (中沙群岛) in the mi
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to accept the territorial “spoils
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littoral nations to claim the 200 n
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neighbors, especially the Southeast
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sertive measures to settle the disp
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Philippines’ claimed South China
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Asian Affairs at the National Secur
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audience (there were 27 of them at
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15th anniversary of the U.S.-Vietna
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compromised by recommending claiman
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Indeed, the current fight over thes
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and the handover of those islands t
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for ruling on maritime disputes: on
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Han Chinese, the ones in Tibet and
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Development takes time. Between now
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• During the Qing Dynasty, the ce
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was erected at the Tibet-China bord
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• In October 1950, the newly-foun
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Deputy Director of the CCP’s Cent
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a statutory position of Special Coo
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equivocally that he does not seek s
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the Chinese, Mongols, and the Turki
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大会 or 世维会). It is an inte
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U.S.-CHINA POWER TRANSITION: AT ODD
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way China develops, and guard again
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• In March 2010, the U.S. State D
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Specifically, they pressed the Chin
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on China on democratic change, dead
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Will China follow the example of U.
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China power transition were to end
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the arms sales business. For all th
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no substitute for the efforts to wi
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With an adjustment in its national
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In addition to these quantitative c
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other items to China that still rem
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ment and containment, with ample ev
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un, this kind of relationship is no
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U.S.-China power transition is a lo
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a preventive war launched by the do
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look Database, April 2010). The Wor
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ary 2006, for a discussion of China
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Chinese critiques of the harmonious
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Rule by Virtue”), 刊授党校,
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year term in prison for what he sai
- Page 232 and 233: 66. Dwight D. Eisenhower, The White
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- Page 238 and 239: The delegates rejected the Soviet a
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- Page 260 and 261: 232. See Shirley Kan, “U.S.-China
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- Page 264 and 265: other activities for the economic e
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- Page 268 and 269: Article 77: Rights of the Coastal S
- Page 270 and 271: Article 81: Drilling on the Contine
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- Page 276 and 277: APPENDIX 3 POTSDAM PROCLAMATION 1 D
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- Page 281: Article 3: Japan will concur in any