The United States and China in Power Transition - Strategic Studies ...

danger of war because the conditions encourage gambling. Only
in a system where a dominant nation and its allies hold a preponderant
superiority over the rest can peace and stability be
assured. Clarity of the “pecking order” promotes peace whereas
relative parity breeds uncertainty and, hence, war. Bruce Bueno
de Mesquita points out that the two schools may have missed the
key point—it is not the distribution of power, but the national decisionmakers’
take on certainty/uncertainty that determines the
course of action. See Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, “Risk, Power Distribution,
and the Likelihood of War,” International Studies Quarterly,
December 1981; and The War Trap, New Haven, CT: Yale
University Press, 1980. The debate, however, is not settled. For
the power transition theory, Organski points out that in theory,
the dominant power is more likely to preempt the challenger, but
in reality, the latter is responsible for most of the power-transition
wars in the past. Steve Chan disputes Organski’s view by providing
analysis that in theory and in reality, the dominant power
initiates the fight. See Steve Chan, China, the U.S., and the Power-
Transition Theory, New York: Routledge, 2008.
7. Thucydides, The History of the Peloponnesian War, New York:
Penguin Books, 1954, emphasis added.
8. Spring and autumn is the Chinese way of characterizing the
change of seasons and time. Confucius used this term as the title
of a chronicle of the State of Lu, Confucius’ home state, and one of
the great powers of the time, and its relations with the other states
between 722 and 481 BC. This period is subsequently named after
this work.
9. The name Warring States came from the Record of the Warring
States (战国策), a work compiled early in the Han Dynasty
(202 BC-220 AD), covering mostly warfare and interstate relations
among the Chinese states from 476 BC to the unification of China
by the Qin in 221 BC.
10. This term is from John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great
Power Politics, New York: Norton, 2001.
11. For a comprehensive discussion of the Correlates of War
project and the datasets, see the following publications: J. David
Singer, Stuart Bremer, and John Stuckey, “Capability Distribution,
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