Science, Strategy and War The Strategic Theory of ... - Boekje Pienter

momentum and tempo, which in combination lead to shock and surprise. Emphasis is on thedefeat and disruption of the enemy - by taking the initiative, and applying constant andunacceptable pressure at the times and places the enemy least expects - rather thanattempting to seize and hold ground for its own sake. It calls for an attitude of mind inwhich doing the unexpected and seeking originality is combined with ruthless determinationto succeed. A key characteristic of the maneuvrist approach is to attack the enemycommander’s decision process by attempting to get inside his decision making cycle. Thisinvolves presenting him with the need to make decisions at a faster rate than he can copewith, so that he takes increasingly inappropriate action or none at all, thereby paralyzing hiscapability to react. Clearly any degradation of the overall command system which can beachieved by physical or other means will hasten the onset of paralysis 11 .Following the same doctrinal footsteps, the doctrine of the Netherlands Army actuallyincludes a, somewhat altered, picture of the OODA loop whereby orientation is interpretedto equate with evaluation and decision equals both planning and deciding 12 .Although not the focus of this paper it is noteworthy to point out that the 1991Gulf War air campaign employed F-16, F-18 and F-15 aircraft, fighters that Boyd helpedcreate. The war itself is by some considered a validation of the innovation in operationaltheory and praxis that matured in AirLand Battle, the doctrine Boyd helped to develop 13 . Infact, Boyd has been credited with directly influencing the design of the military groundcampaign through his association with Dick Cheney, then US Secretary of Defense, a formermember of the so called Military Reform Group, who was well versed in Boyd’s militarythinking. The ground portion of the Desert Storm campaign involved a threat of anamphibious assault on Kuwait, which pinned down forces in that area, and an envelopingmove deep into Iraqi territory behind Iraqi front lines. This design avoided a head to headbattle by US forces on Iraqi strong points. Instead, Iraqi units were surrounded and surprisedby the speedy advance of US forces combined with the multiple thrusts, which created thedemoralizing impression US units were everywhere. The continuous air attacks compoundedthe sense of helplessness and hopelessness, and thousands of Iraqi soldiers surrendered.Deception, ambiguity, tempo, there Boydian elements were clearly present. In the May 61991 issue of US News & World Report Boyd was mentioned, together with two officers whowere directly influenced by Boyd, as the persons who determined the tactics employedduring the Gulf War. As Robert Coram asserts, everything successful about the Gulf War is adirect reflection of Boyd’s Patterns of Conflict 14 .In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, US Secretary of Stateand former chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff Colin Powell implicitly honored Boydby talking of a response involving multiple thrusts and getting inside the adversary’s decisioncycle 15 . Looking back on the stunning victory of Operation Iraqi Freedom (2003) againstsubstantial Iraqi armed forces, the commander of the coalition troops, General TommyFranks also referred explicitly to Boyd’s idea of getting inside the enemy’s decision cycle 16 .11 British Defence Doctrine, Joint Warfare Publication 0-01 (Her Brittanic Majesty's Stationary Office,London, 1997), pp.4.8-4.9.12 Militaire Doctrine, (Sdu Uitgevers, Den Haag, 1996), p.121.13 See for Boyd's role for instance Hallion, pp.38-42, and pp.278-281.14 Coram, p.425, 444. The other two were Mike Wyly and Huba Wass de Czege, who were closelyinvolved in the doctrinal shifts of the US Marines and US Army respectively. Chapter 31 of Coram'sbook describes Boyd's role in Desert Storm.15 Coram, pp.446-447.16 See the interview with general Tommy Franks in Peter J. Boyer, ‘The New War Machine’, The NewYorker, June 30, 2003, p.70. In the article the author also introduces the military reform movement and5