Science, Strategy and War The Strategic Theory of ... - Boekje Pienter
Science, Strategy and War The Strategic Theory of ... - Boekje Pienter
Science, Strategy and War The Strategic Theory of ... - Boekje Pienter
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Some arrangements <strong>of</strong> connections will make a system resistant to change <strong>and</strong> others canfacilitate instability 135 . When one element or relation cannot change unless others do, small<strong>and</strong> slow adjustments will not be possible, each element has a veto over all the others. Inother cases one element controls another, which in turn controls a third thereby producinggreat indirect influence. <strong>The</strong> point is however that the character <strong>of</strong> interconnections are notalways obvious. If the chains are short or the processes are familiar the character <strong>of</strong> therelationship may be obvious but when chains are long <strong>and</strong> intricate the results are more likelyto be surprising. <strong>The</strong> importance <strong>of</strong> this observations is that the perception <strong>of</strong> the character<strong>of</strong> interconnections strongly influence policy preferences 136 .So we cannot underst<strong>and</strong> systems if we only know the attributes <strong>and</strong> goals <strong>of</strong> asystems. <strong>The</strong> shape <strong>of</strong> the interconnections is crucial. <strong>The</strong> result <strong>of</strong> interconnections is thateffects <strong>of</strong> actions are <strong>of</strong>tentimes indirect, mediated <strong>and</strong> delayed <strong>and</strong> indirect effects may bemore important than direct ones. Related to this is that the short term impact <strong>of</strong> any actionwill be different than the long term outcome <strong>and</strong> if an actor is basing his subsequent actionson the short term results <strong>of</strong> his previous actions it will be hard to establish effectiveness <strong>of</strong>any action.An extension <strong>of</strong> this observation is that actions <strong>of</strong>ten interact in non-linear ways.Where two chemicals are not toxic when taken in separately, when combined they may belethal. <strong>The</strong> problem for strategists is that a variable in a system may operate through a nonlinearfunction, that means that it may have a disproportionate effect after a while when theeffects <strong>of</strong> an action have passed through the chain. Another interesting trait is that thedirection as well as the size <strong>of</strong> an effect can be reversed as the stimulus increases. After aninitial scare from being bombed researchers have noted a stiffening <strong>of</strong> resistance inpopulations in Germany <strong>and</strong> Great Britain, so instead <strong>of</strong> breaking the morale, it actuallystiffened it. <strong>The</strong> conclusion <strong>of</strong> this is that because the trajectory being followed is notunilinear, moving toward a goal may bring one further from it rather than closer to it. 137An important observation for a strategic planner is that complex behavior may leadto false conclusions about the effectiveness <strong>of</strong> attacking a variable. <strong>The</strong> fact that one hastried to change the behavior <strong>of</strong> a system by affecting a variable without the expected effectdoes not mean that variable is unimportant but that change requires that more than just thisone variable needs to be altered 138 . Non-linearity <strong>and</strong> the interaction <strong>of</strong> variables also lead tothe fact that jumps rather than smooth incremental changes <strong>and</strong> progressions characterizeoperations <strong>of</strong> systems. 139 Complex systems <strong>of</strong>ten fail because <strong>of</strong> the failure <strong>of</strong> severalcomponents, each <strong>of</strong> which would have been harmless had the other not occurred 140 .So results cannot be predicted from the separate actions. <strong>The</strong> effect <strong>of</strong> one variablefrequently depends on the state <strong>of</strong> another <strong>and</strong> it is therefore difficult to apportion theresponsibility among them as the extent <strong>and</strong> even the direction <strong>of</strong> the impact <strong>of</strong> eachdepends on the status <strong>of</strong> the others. Further complexities are introduced when we look at theinteractions that occur between strategies when actors consciously react to others <strong>and</strong>anticipate what they think others will do. An actor’s policies can make possible or foreclosethe adversaries strategies, so judgment about the merit <strong>of</strong> a strategy should always keep inview the one <strong>of</strong> the opponent. But actors <strong>of</strong>ten fail to appreciate both the degree to whichtheir strategies are sensitive to those <strong>of</strong> others <strong>and</strong> the ability <strong>of</strong> the adversary to change its135 Ibid, p.18.136 Ibid, p.24.137 Ibid, p.37.138 Ibid.139 Ibid.140 Ibid, p.41.157