Science, Strategy and War The Strategic Theory of ... - Boekje Pienter

Why strategic theorizing is difficult“Good” strategic theory does not equate to an ability to provide certainty in predictions, yetthe demands for pragmatism mean theory must be able to inform plans and actions with arationale for achieving success. The problem facing strategic theorists is that thecircumstance for which strategic theory is developed will be largely unknown and moreoverunknowable much in advance of the moment of testing the strategic theory, though theuncertainty is itself a factor to be reckoned with in one’s strategic doctrine 81 . Moreover,strategic theory is evolutionary and paradoxical. These factors imply strategic theory isdynamic in a fundamental way, and this character affects the potential for making good andlasting theory concerning strategy.Strategic theory is evolutionary in the sense that theories are developed that take intoaccount novel actors, such as states or terrorist groups, new technologies such as tanks,aircraft or nuclear weapons, or phenomena such as the impact of the industrial revolution orthe rise of mass emotions in nationalistically and ideologically inspired wars 82 . Thecontemporary social context determines what the actors, weapons, aims, norms, etc. are thatare employed in a purposeful manner in war, and as this social context evolves, so does (orshould) strategic theory 83 . Strategists have had difficulty abstracting themselves from thefeatures of a given war or period, and identifying the lasting characteristics that would applyto all contexts and all periods 84 . As a result their work generally reflect the war, or factorsthat affect it, as seen through the eyes of people living in their own time, imparting acontemporary color to their military thinking 85 .This affects the nature of theory development. In principle knowledge growsthrough a steady improvement of theory, which is achieved through a repetitious encounterof theory and reality. This is what Thomas Kuhn calls additive accumulation whereby onerefines and expands on what one already knows 86 . The dynamic nature of strategy and warhowever are not conducive to a steady growth of knowledge because the object - war, actors,weapons, rules - alter constantly and in fairly rapid tempo, at least in the past 200 years.Subsequently strategic theory development does not follow a clear cumulative growth path inwhich new theories built upon former ones, improving the older ones or expanding theirrange of application. This has obvious consequences for evaluating novel strategic theories.One could argue that contemporary strategic theory builds upon the foundation laidby the authoritive body of work developed by Clausewitz. His work On War may rightly beconsidered the Western paradigm for studying war and making strategy. Brodie considered81 Brodie, p. 452.82 See for instance Ken Booth, ‘The Evolution of Strategic Thinking’, in John Baylis, Ken Booth, JohnGarnett & Phil Williams, Contemporary Strategy, Volume I, Second Edition (Holmes & Meier, NewYork, 1987).83 See for instance Wright, pp.151-152.84 Avi Kober, ‘Nomology vs Historicism: Formative Factors in Modern Military Thought’, DefenseAnalysis, Vol. 10, No. 3, 1994, p.268. Actually he also states that the way lessons are learned affectmilitary theory. However, Kober fails to show to what extend it is markedly different in its effect ontheory making as compared to the more thoroughly discussed factor of the nature of war.85 Wright, p. 271.86 This is what “normal science” does, according to Kuhn, in various parts of The Structure of ScientificRevolutions, (Chicago, 1970), see for instance p.6, 24, or 80.26