Science, Strategy and War The Strategic Theory of ... - Boekje Pienter

Such a division can also be discerned in strategic theory which knows variousschools that derive their insight from various sources of inspiration and have qualified rangesof applicability. A similar observation holds true for strategic management theory. Theexistence of (at least) ten schools of thought betrays the complexity of organizationalbehavior. Gray distinguishes four levels to categorize strategic theories, and although eachlevel has its merits, a general theory of war provides the most holistic approach andsubsequently has the most value for commanders who, in order to shape strategy for aparticular war, must understand how war in general, qua war works 53 :1. A level that transcends time, environment, political and social conditions and technology (forinstance Clausewitz and Sun Tzu).2. A level that explains how the geographical and functional complexities of war and strategyinteract and complement each other. (Corbett on naval warfare)3. A level that explains how a particular kind or use of military power strategically affects thecourse of conflict as a whole. (Mahan, Douhet, Schelling on the role of maritime power, airpower and nuclear power respectively)4. A level that explains the character of war in a particular period, keyed to explicit assumptionsabout the capabilities of different kinds of military power and their terms of effectiveengagement. (the use of air power as a coercive tool)General strategic theory educates politicians and commanders broadly as to the nature,structure, and dynamic workings of the instrument to which they might have to resort. Thechief utility of a general theory of war and strategy lies in its ability not to point out lessons,but to isolate things that need thinking about. It must provide insight and questions, notanswers 54 . Strategic theory in this sense educates the mind by providing intellectualorganization, defining terms, it suggests connections among apparently disparate matters,and offers speculative consequentionalist postulates 55 .The foundation of modern strategic theory was laid by the classical strategistsClausewitz, Mahan and Corbett, who discovered, based on meticulous historical research, inmore or less theoretical terms the nature of war and strategic behavior and the identity andpractices and kinds of behavior likely to promote strategic success or strategic failure.Clausewitz in particular provides a system of thought on war and strategy 56 . It is probably theonly true general theory of war and strategy 57 . It is testimony to Boyd that Gray, whileobserving poverty in contemporary general strategic theory, ranks Boyd among the fewauthors of the 20 th Century that succeeded in some measure in developing a general theory,despite the substantial difficulties of such an endeavor.Clausewitz provided also an analysis on the proper use of theory. Theory, accordingto Clausewitz, should cast a steady light on all phenomena so that we can more easilysystems, on his way of dealing with cognitive and political constraints on rationality, on the waydecisions are made, who the policy influentials are and what psychological, cultural and politicalvariables shape and influence the adversary's goals, perceptions, calculations, and behavior. Seepp.125-131.53 Gray, Modern Strategy, pp.125-12654 Ibid, p.128.55 Ibid, p.36.56 Ibid, pp.80-81. The similarity is striking between the historical approach followed by Clausewitz,Corbett and Mahan, and the importance they attach to proper critical study of history and thefocussed comparative case study method advocated by George to obtain both conceptual knowledgeand generic knowlefge of conditions favoring a strategy.57 Gray repeats this message quite a few times: see Modern Strategy, pp.84, 85, 126.22