Science, Strategy and War The Strategic Theory of ... - Boekje Pienter

supplies, depend upon large-scale support from the civilian rear, and much of their thinkingis devoted to the relationship between the bases of operations and the lines of operationsand logistics 121 . The works of Liddell Hart, Fuller, Douhet and Mitchell reflect the trauma ofthe First World War, the mechanization of the battlefield and the increasing and intensifyinginvolvement of society in war, despite the fact that they develop different solutions to theproblem of the vast destruction of modern war 122 . Jablonksi adds the naval warfare theoristJulian Corbett to this list 123 . The theorist of nuclear war where, of course, influenced by theinstantaneous destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.Specific strategic circumstances of their home country also affect the formation ofstrategic theory of an author. Clausewitz’ work is distinctly continental, reflecting both hisexperience and the Prussian geo-strategic predicament. Douhet did not conceal the fact thatthe formulation of his ideas with regard to defeating the enemy through aerial bombing ofthe civilian population and the industrial infrastructure was influenced by the strategicposition of Italy. Mitchell addressed the vulnerability of the US for strategicbombardment 124 . Julian Corbett wrote in a period in which England “ruled the waves” as animperialist power. Mao altered Marx’ theory of revolutinary war to suit the Chinese agrariansociety. Instead of Marx’ proletariat, in the Chinese socio-economic context, for Mao thepeasantry played a key role in the revolution and guerrilla warfare 125 . Even as recently as the1990’s, we can see how specific strategic circumstances can inspire strategic debate. Thedilemma’s of the ethnic wars in the Balkan led to a new search for the dynamics of coercivediplomacy can military strategies as part of that.Personal experience is particularly evident is the works of Clausewitz and Jomini,who both took part in battles during the Napoleonic Wars, although that by itself does notexplain the fundamental insights in the nature of war that Clausewitz in particular developed.The command experiences of Douhet en Mitchell and the didactic responsibilities of Corbettand Mahan have often been noted as important factors for explaining their work.All of these factors combine in Azar Gat’s comparison of Clausewitz and LiddellHart. Despite differences in character and style, there are striking similarities in theirapproach to strategy. According to Gat, ‘both thinkers reacted to cataclysmic and epochmakingwars which had resulted in a national trauma and profound intellectualtransformation. In both, their experiences produced a violent reaction against past militarytheory and practice, held to be responsible for the disaster. Both advanced a new model ofmilitary theory, which they held universally valid and which involved an unhistoricalapproach to the special conditions that had determined the pattern of the past. Both werenot just ‘idly theorizing’ but developed and preached their ideas out of consumingcommitment to their countries’ future’ 126 . This description could equally be applied to JohnBoyd. Boyd’s work comprises a specific intellectual response to the military problems of theUS armed forces in the immediate aftermath of the Vietnam War and his arguments arecolored by this predicament in the sense that he aimed to change a specific mindset and adoctrine that, in his view, was dysfunctional.121 Ibid, p.273.122 Ibid.123 David Jablonsky, Roots of Strategy, Book 4, (Stackpole Books, Mechanicsburg, Pa, 1999).124 Ibid, p.22125 Kober, p.276.126 Azar Gat, Fascist and Liberal Visions of War, (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1998), p.175.33