Science, Strategy and War The Strategic Theory of ... - Boekje Pienter

strategy. He elaborates on several aspects of Patterns, disclosing what lies at the heart of thestrategic game between open systems – interaction and isolation- what type of organizationalstructure and culture is required – flexibility, network, autonomy, open and trust arekeywords here - returning in the end to the message of the essay, translated in digestibleform, showing that what lies at the heart of succesful strategic behavior is similar to thedynamic at play in science, engineering, and technology. Then, in a last exercise of synthesis,Boyd draws the comprehensive OODA loop graphic, accompanied by the five statements,showing what constitutes the OODA loop and what it means. It showed that the OODAloop is much less a model of decisionmaking than a model of individual and organizationallearning and adaptation in which the element of orientation – made up of genetics,experience, culture - and plays the dominant role in the game of hypothesis and test, ofanalysis and synthesis, destruction and creation.The focus on adaptability also shows in Boyd’s discussion on modes of conflict.Even when Boyd acknowledges his preference, he still is much less dogmatic then, forinstance, Liddell Hart. Liddell Hart was much more in the tradition of Jomini thanClausewitz, Luvaas has argued 5 . Where Liddell Hart asserted that all victories could in theend be attributed to the application of the indirect approach, Boyd included an elaboratediscussion of cases and causes in which the indirect approach (or Blitzkrieg concept)succeeded or failed. Indeed, each mode of warfare is joined by a discussion of the countermove to that mode. His eye was trained upon the dialectic, the paradoxical and evolutionarycharacter of strategy. Where Liddell Hart saw victory always accruing from the application ofthe indirect approach, Boyd saw the process of action-reaction, of learning, anticipation,invention, and counter-movements. Thus Boyd took his audience to insights that heconsidered more important: a balanced, broad and critical view in stead of the doctrinaire.Boyd searched not for one particular optimum, but instead acknowledged thecontingent nature of war, and focused on the universal processes and features thatcharacterize war, strategy, and the game of winning and losing. Boyd argues that one shouldrespond with an appropriate frame to analyze the situation at hand. Depending on the kindof war, this argues that the strategist would select that partial strategic theory that fits withthe specific situation. Several modes of warfare are part of the repertoire for war, a menu ofmoves and ideas, a general must be able to choose from and a society must be prepared towage, depending on the circumstances, and each category knows its specific opposite anopponent may use to negate the benefits of that approach.Sun Tzu, Clausewitz, J.F.C. Fuller, T.E. Lawrence, Basil Liddell Hart, John Wylie andAndre Beaufre, to name but a few familiar strategists 98 , preceded him in recognizing that warand strategy involve learning and revolve around the mind, although few equal Boyd in hisfocus on the cognitive dimension of man and social systems. But no modern strategist andcertainly no contemporary one, developed a theory based on the scientific concepts hediscovered due to his deliberate and broad study of scientific literature.A general theory of organizational survivalThe comprehensive OODA loop model can be applied to almost all levels as an explanatorytool. Boyd is persuasive in showing the relevance and the applicability of it at the individual,5 Jay Luvaas, ‘Clausewitz: Fuller and Liddell Hart’, Journal of Strategic Studies, 9 (1986), p.207.98 In Introduction to Strategy (London, 1965) on p. 45 and p. 136 Beaufre states that ‘strategy must be acontinuous process of original thinking, based upon hypotheses which must be proved true or false asaction proceeds’. Furthermore Beaufre recognizes that initiative and freedom of action are essential (p.36).284