Science, Strategy and War The Strategic Theory of ... - Boekje Pienter

the fatigued, with the sated await the hungry’ 80 . Elsewhere Sun Tzu says that the troopsshould be looked upon as beloved children 81 . Other factors that appear as motivating andunifying factors are penetrating deeply into enemy terrain and in general the commander,officers and troops sharing exposure to risk. A commander should thus being able to directhis troops as though commanding one man 82 and ‘one whose upper and lower ranks havethe same desires’ (and will thus be victorious) 83 so he can ‘in order await the disordered’ 84 .Trust, fairness, integrity, leadership and discipline are modern terms for this, ones Boydwould also incorporate.Surprise, Deception and deceit. Without surprise at some stage in the encounter with theopponent it will be difficult to mass superior force at a certain point. Surprise is achievedthrough the interaction, the reinforcing effect of several methods applied simultaneously 85 . Itinvolves the employment of deception and deceit. For instance, it is achieved by movingseparated and keep the opponent guessing where one will unite, or if one is united, one candisperse again in the hope that the opponent has united and thereby committed his forces.Troop deployments or the image thereof are used together with disinformation from(expendable) spies, as well as feigning certain activities that serve as indicators of upcomingoperations to the trained eye of the opposing commander, all serve the end of deceiving theopponent. Of course all efforts to deceive must be matched by making sure one’s realintentions and movements are shrouded in secrecy and with this we arrive at the concept ofbeing unfathomable and formless.Being unfathomable and formless. Sun Tzu stresses the need for a commander to beunfathomable and obscure, never revealing his plans or intentions even to his own troops 86 .Being unfathomable through deception and deceit will cause the opposing commander to beconfused or forced to respond in a way that is not according to his initial plan. He is forcedto react especially when he suddenly discovers that his opponent is moving to an object thathe needs to defend. Thus he is shaped. These ideas surface in the statement:One who excels at moving the enemy deploys in a configuration to which the enemy mustrespond. He offers something that the enemy must seize. With profit he moves them, withthe foundation he awaits them 87 .Related to deception and being unfathomable is the idea of being formless. Whenever thearmy deploys onto the battlefield, its configuration, being immediately apparent, will evoke areaction (he too is according with the enemy) in the enemy. Whether the enemy will thenmodify his original anticipations, vary his tactics or view the events as confirming a80 Ibid, ch. 7, p.199.81 Ibid, ch.10, p. 21582 Ibid, ch.11, p. 224.83 Ibid, ch.3, p.178.84 Ibid, ch.7, p.199.85 Sun Tzu's military thought has frequently been erroneously identified solely with deceit anddeception. These two term however connect ideas that ultimately need to produce surprise. Onlytwice do deception and deceit appear explicitly in the book. The most famous one is found in Chapter1 where it is stated that ‘warfare is the Tao of deception. Thus although you are capable, displayincapability to them. When committed to employing your forces, feign inactivity. When your objectiveis nearby, make it appear as if distant; when far away, create the illusion of being nearby’. The secondone appears in Chapter 7 and states that ‘thus the army is established by deceit, moves for advantage,and changes through segmenting and reuniting’.86 Ibid, ch.11, p.222.87 Ibid, ch. 5, p.188.61