Science, Strategy and War The Strategic Theory of ... - Boekje Pienter

This situation also reflected the dominance of the “bomber community” within the US AirForce. Within the context of the Cold War during the fifties and sixties, strategic bombingwas the prime role of the US Air Force. This thinking was also applied to gaining airsuperiority, which was to be achieved by bombing enemy air bases. Tactical air power was aneglected subject and tactical air units were not considered to core business of the USAF.When Boyd entered this project he carried out EM tests and began questioning theswing-wing advantages in light of the structural and weight design penalties. He rejected theFX proposal and, together with technical expert went on the look for options to reduce theweight while increasing its maneuverability. What Boyd and some others around him aimedfor was keeping costs down while ensuring maximum relevant performance vis à vis currentSoviet counterparts. To accomplish this it was necessary to omit all subsystems notabsolutely essential to the mission, to resist the temptation to use unproved advancedtechnology and to eliminate the requirements for complex avionics, high top speeds, andexcessive ranges 10 .Their case was strengthened by the presence of a group of former fighter aces fromWorld War II and the Korean War whom had now achieved general officers rank, and who,in 1965, had drafted a paper underscoring the need for a an air superiority fighter, not amulti-mission hybrid. This went against the grain of conventional wisdom within the USAF.With high level backing Boyd and a number of other mid-level military and civilian technicalexperts within the Pentagon transformed the USAF approach to air superiority between1966 and 1972 11 . What assisted them also was the rude shock of the 1967 Domodovedo AirShow in Moscow where the soviets showcased their latest generation of combat aircraft (theMig-23, Mig-25 and Mig-27). By 1968 it had become official policy that the USAF needed afirst line tactical fighter that was designed primarily for air to air combat.Boyd’s continued efforts and his EM concept in no small measure contributed tothe subsequent development of the F-15 fighter with excellent performances. In fact, varioussources acknowledge that no one else had as much to do with the definition of the F-15 asBoyd. However, still unsatisfied with the high costs and still less than optimum performancedue to seemingly unavoidable design compromises resulting in weight increases, Boyd and afew others from within the Pentagon and industry, a group dubbed ‘the Fighter Mafia’,decided an even lighter and less complex aircraft would give the air superiority capabilitiessought after.Central in this effort was the notion of “agility”, a concept later to emerge in Boyd’swork on strategy. With EM theory Boyd proved the F-86 advantage in Korea was inparticular due to its ability to transition from one maneuver to another faster than the Mig-15. The notion of fast transient maneuvering as the key to winning was to remain with Boydwhen he developed his thoughts on military success in general. For now, using EM theory hecould show that superior maneuvrering capability, combined with better training and cockpitdesign offering an advantage in time and superior “situational awareness” mitigated the Mig-15 speed and turn advantage. The new light weight fighter would have unprecedentedcapability for “fast transients” in addition to a high thrust to weight ratio which wouldproduce the required energy maneuverability.Despite USAF reluctance and without official backing the fighter mafia designed an“austere fighter”, the F-XX, and presented their case to various Pentagon officials. His10 Coram deals extensively with Boyd's involvement in the design of the F-15 and the F-16 in Part II,pp. 123-256.11 Richard P. Hallion, Storm over Iraq, Air Power and the Gulf War, (Smithsonian Institute Press,Washington D.C.), 1992, p.38. This section is derived from Hallion, pp. 27-54, Cowan, pp.13-15 andHammond, pp.67-100. All attest to Boyd’s immense influence.44