Science, Strategy and War The Strategic Theory of ... - Boekje Pienter

Boyd also resembles Liddell Hart in his didactic method. Liddell Hart had a messageand was not out to make good history 40 . Against a background of a sweeping reversal ofattitudes in Britain towards WWI and the phenomenon of war itself, Liddell Hart undertooka wholesale revision of the accepted precepts of military theory. Synthesizing Fuller, theFrench School, Lawrence and Corbett, Liddell Hart projected a mirror image of nineteenthcentury warfare and view of the past, which had been formulated on the Continent in the ageof nationalism. Eighteenth century warfare, discredited and despised by the men of the 19 thcentury became an example to be emulated and revived. The Napoleonic model became theNapoleonic fallacy. Clausewitz became the false prophet. Total war was to be replaced bylimited war and the effort to gain victory by crushing the enemy’s power substituted by acalculated action, mindful of the subsequent peace. The decisive clash of forces in a majorbattle to be replaced by indirect means. War was not milling; it was wrestling, or better jujitsu.The most effective indirect approach is one that lures or startles the opponent into afalse move – so that, as in ju-jitsu, his own effort is turned into the lever of his overthrow 41 .Boyd copied this line of reasoning, or at least so strongly agreed with this way ofconstructing the argument that he formulated a very close image of Liddell Hart’s argument.In Strategy: The Indirect Approach Liddell Hart strives to show that the achievements ofthe great captains of all ages had rarely been brought about by the direct clash of forces butall usually involved the prior psychological and physical dislocation of the enemy. He arguesthat ‘the most decisive victory is of no value if a nation be bled white while gaining it’ 42 . Itshould be the aim then of grand strategy to discover and pierce the Achilles heel of theopposing government’s power to make war. And strategy, in turn, should seek to penetrate ajoint in the harness of the opposing forces. To strike with strong effect one must strike atweakness. It is thus more potent as well as more economical to disarm the enemy than toattempt his destruction by hard fighting. Thus, following Fuller, he states that a strategistshould think in terms of paralyzing, not of killing.Even on the lower plane of warfare, a man killed is merely one man less, whereas aman unnerved is a highly infectious carrier of fear, capable of spreading an epidemic ofpanic. On a higher plane of warfare, the impression made on the mind of the opposingcommander can nullify the whole fighting power his troops possess, and on a still higherplane, psychological pressure on the government of a country may suffice to cancel all theresources at its command - so that the sword drops from a paralyzed hand 43 .The role of Grand Strategy is thus to coordinate and direct all the resources of anation or band of nations towards the attainment of the political object of the war. It shouldboth calculate and develop the economic resources and man power of nations in order tosustain the fighting services. But not only the material forces determine the outcome of war.Also the moral forces of the people should be mobilized, their spirit and motivation raised.A good cause is a sword as well as armor. Likewise, chivalry can be a most effective weapon40 Liddell Hart has been thoroughly criticized for his methods, his sloppy history and hismisinterpretation of Clausewitz and the actions of senior military figures in WWI. See for instanceJohn Mearsheimer, Liddell Hart and the Weight of History (Ithaca, New York, 1988). However, recentlymore and more authors acknowledge that Liddell Hart's later work is more sophisticated and original,that indeed the Blitzkrieg practitioners were inspired by Fuller and Liddel Hart and that hisinterpretations of Clausewitz is not too wide off the mark altogether, in particular in view on themeaning of the famous Clausewitzian dictum of war as a ‘continuation of policy by other means’. Seefor instance Alex Dachev, ‘Liddell Hart’s Big Idea’, Review of International Studies (1999), 25, pp.29-48.41 Danchev, p.33.42 Liddell Hart, Strategy, p.212.43 Ibid.53