Science, Strategy and War The Strategic Theory of ... - Boekje Pienter

enriches the cumulative inductive and deductive achievements and provides what Boydrefers to as many-sided, implicit cross-references.Boyd’s study of science was essential to the development of his arguments. AsHammond states ‘his study of chemistry, physics, and biology, his investigations about howthe brain works, the nature of memory, how one learns, thinks, and questions, were centralto his worldview’ 174 . Boyd himself specifically included a list of ‘disciplines or activities to beexamined’ when going to the heart of strategy. This list mentions mathematical logic,physics, thermodynamics, biology, psychology, anthropology and conflict studies 175 . Hisenormous appetite for books on such a diversity of subjects was not ephemeral to him.Appreciating the relevance of Boyd’s interest in science therefore is an essential ingredientfor understanding A Discourse.Science plays a more distinct role as formative factor in Boyd’s work than in that ofother strategic theorists. Whereas the previously discussed authors were mostly indirectlyinfluenced by the scientific climate of their time, such as Clausewitz, or where others tried toformulate a theory that fit a specific scientific model, such as Jomini or Fuller, Boyd activelyand purposefully oriented himself in a variety of disciplines in order to acquire new insights,a better understanding of the complex phenomenon of war and strategic behavior. Contraryto Jomini, for instance, and later J.F.C. Fuller, who both aimed to formulate a theory thatcould hold up to the way physics developed theory, in order to gain an aura of universality(and a good measure of scientific acceptability), Boyd deliberately did not favor one scientificmodel or discipline over the other. He recognized similarities (for instance the essential roleof uncertainty) among the various disciplines. They all pertained on the study of the behaviorof human organizations in violent conflict, and he valued disciplines for the insight theyprovided, the metaphors they offer for seeing new things in familiar object, the way theyimproved his understanding.Additionally he paid close attention to the process of scientific progress itself. Boydwas conscious of the formative factors that shaped his work, and actually made a deliberateeffort to look for possible new angles on war and strategy, it was part of his efforts toimprove his own “orientation”. For Boyd combining different perspectives was crucial forlearning and understanding. Anything that could prove relevant to increase his understandingabout strategic behavior had his interest. Hammond describes Boyd’s Way as ‘a sort ofWestern Zen’:It is a state of mind, a learning of the oneness of things, an appreciation for fundamentalinsights known in Eastern philosophy and religion as simply the Way [or Tao]. For Boyd, theWay is not an end but a process, a journey […] The connections, the insights that flow fromexamining the world in different ways, from different perspectives, from routinely examiningthe opposite proposition, were what were important. The key is mental agility 176 .And the mind of a strategist should combine the analytical as well as the synthetical.Concerning methodology in strategic theory Boyd argues for, and demonstrates, an eclecticapproach, because for Boyd the fields and disciplines he studied were all related 177 . AsHammond summarizes Boyd’s view:174 Ibid, pp.12-13.175 Boyd, Strategic Game of ? and ?, p.12.176 Hammond, p.15.177 Or as Hammond notes on p.186: ‘from biology to chaos, future defense scenarios to informationwar, Sun Tzu and Musashi to the Ames spy case, genetic algorithms to how one thinks and learns,167