Science, Strategy and War The Strategic Theory of ... - Boekje Pienter

The aim for Clausewitz, Boyd thought, was to ‘render the enemy powerless’, which stronglyimplies ‘the destruction of the opponent’s armed forces’. And whereas Boyd, with Sun Tzu,regarded friction, uncertainty as fundamental and unavoidable but also a potential crucialtool, Clausewitz considered uncertainty, fear, anxiety and other moral factors as animpediment 48 . These ideas were in obvious contradiction with Boyd’s views and he captureshis critique on one slide. Boyd asserts that 49 :Clausewitz over-emphasized decisive battle and under-emphasized strategic maneuver.Clausewitz emphasized method and routine at the tactical level.Clausewitz was concerned with trying to overcome or reduce friction/uncertainty andfailed to address the idea of magnifying adversary’s friction/uncertainty.Clausewitz was concerned with trying to exhaust adversary by influencing him toincrease his expenditure of effort. He failed to address, or develop, the idea of trying toparalyze adversary by denying him the opportunity to expend effort.Clausewitz incorrectly stated: “a center of gravity is always found where the mass isconcentrated most densely” - then argued that this is the place where the blows mustbe aimed and where the decision should be reached. He failed to develop idea ofgenerating many non-cooperative centers of gravity by striking at those vulnerable, yetcritical, tendons, connections, and activities that permit a larger system’s center ofgravity to exist.Boyd blames Clausewitz for not seeing ‘that many non-cooperative, or conflicting, centers ofgravity paralyze the adversary by denying him the opportunity to operate in a directedfashion, hence they impede vigorous activity and magnify friction’. And the likely result ofthe Clausewitzian approach, with its lack of variety, so Boyd argued, would be operationsthat ‘end in a bloodbath via the well regulated, stereotyped tactics and unimaginative battlesof attrition suggested by Clausewitz’ 50 .Boyd turns his attention next to Baron Henri de Jomini in whose work he discernssome interesting ideas. Jomini stresses free and rapid movements, which carry the bulk of theforces successively against fractions of the enemy. He advises to strike in the most decisivedirection - that is to say against the center of one wing or the center and one wingsimultaneously. If possible, one should seize the adversary’s communications and force himto fight on a reverse front, by using bulk of the forces to hit the flank and attack him in therear. Detachments can be employed, if necessary, to block the arrival of reinforcements aswell as for drawing the opponent’s attention elsewhere. If the enemy’s forces are too muchextended, one should pierce his center to divide and crush his fractions separately.48 Ibid, p.40. Again the influence of Liddell Hart, Lawrence and Fuller is evident. Interestingly, at thetime Boyd developed Patterns of Conflict other authors advocated a revival of Clausewitz, not because ofthe strategic advice, but because of the insight he offers in the nature of war. See for instance BernardBrodie’s War and Politics. These authors point out the relevance of Clausewitz's advice concerning thestrong relationship between politics and war. Moreover, in a time in which nucelar weapons and bodycounts were emblematic of the managerial, technocratic and deterministic attitude among political andmilitary elites, in Clausewitz they discerned an awareness of the moral and psychological factorsaffecting battles and wars. For a recent assessment of Clausewitz see Colin Gray, Modern Strategy,Chapter. 3. Interestingly Boyd borrows heavily from Clausewitz by using the concepts of center ofgravity and friction. Clausewitz actually allows for several centers of gravity, some of which are notmilitary in nature such as alliances and cities, making him quite compatible with Sun Tzu.49 Ibid, p.41.50 Ibid, p.42.191