Science, Strategy and War The Strategic Theory of ... - Boekje Pienter

Boyd’s inspiration also came in part from some fiasco’s he had witnesses in the USarmed forces exercises and operations, such as the failed evacuation operation Desert I inIran. In his introduction he points out that normal, ‘institutional responses to such failures ismore and better sensors, more communications, more and better display devices, moresatellites, more and better fusion centers, etc. – all tied into one giant fully informed, fullycapable Command and Control system. This way of thinking emphasizes hardware as thesolution 2 .Boyd’s approach is process oriented, or in his words, ‘I think there is a different way,a way that emphasizes the implicit nature of human beings. In this sense, the followingdiscussion will uncover what we mean by both implicit nature and organic design’ 3 .Criteria for command and controlHe starts out with providing some guiding thoughts as the background for the rest of hisargument, much as he had done in the first pages of Patterns of Conflict. In effect, he lays out aset of criteria around which a command and control philosophy must be designed. Boydasserts that we: Need insight and vision to unveil adversary plans and actions as well as “foresee” own goalsand appropriate plans and actions. Need focus and direction to achieve some goal or aim. Need adaptability, to cope with uncertain and everchanging circumstances. Need security, to remain unpredictable 4 .The rationale for these criteria is also offered and it is closely related to the two variants ofthe set of four elements Boyd had introduced in Patterns of Conflict:variety/rapidity/harmony/initiative (Patterns of Conflict, p.12);insight/initiative/adaptability/harmony (Patterns of Conflict, p.185).As Boyd explains, ‘without insight and vision there can be no orientation to deal with bothpresent and future. Without focus and direction, implied or explicit, there can be neitherharmony of effort nor initiative for vigorous effort. Adaptability implies variety and rapidity.Without variety and rapidity one can neither be unpredictable nor cope with changing andunforeseen circumstances. Without security one becomes predictable, hence one loses thebenefits of the above’ 5 . From this basis, Boyd sets out to develop a normative view on adesign for command and control. Like Patterns of Conflict, he starts with some historicalKhan of Khans (1969) and A Genius for War (1977); J.F.C. Fuller, Grant ands Lee, (1932); Richard Gabrieland Paul Savage, Crisis in Command (1978); Richard Gabriel and Reuven Gal, 'The IDF Officer:Linchpin in Unit Cohesion', Army (January 1984); John Gardner, Morale (1978); Simon Goodenoughand Len Deighton, Tactical Genius in Battle (1979); Heinz Guderian, Panzer Leader (1952); RichardHumble, Hitler's Generals (1974); Albert Kesselring et al, Manual for Command and Combat Employment ofSmaller Units (1952); Harold Lamb, Genghis Khan (1927); Kenneth Macksey, Guderian, Creator of theBlitzkrieg (1976); S.L.A. Marshall, Men Against Fire (1947); Erwin Rommel, Infantery Attacks (1937);Charles Whiting, Patton (1970); and importantly, Martin van Creveld, Command in War (1982).2 Organic design for Command and Control, p.23 Ibid. It is not difficult to see the influence of The Tacit Dimension in this.4 Ibid, p.3.5 Ibid, p.4.234