Science, Strategy and War The Strategic Theory of ... - Boekje Pienter

ehavior in reaction to what the other is doing. Jervis mentions the example of NorthVietnam reverting to guerrilla warfare to mitigate the effects of the conventional strategy ofthe US 141 . Which leads to the observation that actions lead to alterations in the environment.And this in turn has the effect that identical but later behavior does not produce identicalresults.Indirect and delayed effects, the unpredictable interactions of variables, learning andanticipation, they all lead to the familiar problem of lack of predictability of actions. The useof yardsticks for effectiveness also becomes problematical. Looking at a single or evenmultiple quantitative yardsticks to measure success in a complex system is likely to misleadbecause it fails to capture the multiple and indirect effects that will become increasinglyimportant as the system reacts to the actor’s behavior. It may not give the correct pictureabout the state of a system’s effectiveness 142 .Jervis concludes his book with three suggestions for strategies that may overcome ortake into account the problems we have discussed:Constraining the opponent’s options;Understanding the non-linearity of the environment;Aim for indirect effects and apply multiple strategies.First people can constrain other actors and reduce if not eliminate the extent to which theirenvironment is highly systemic and characterized by unintended consequences. Constraintcan be induced by foreclosing options and severing interconnections. It limits the decisionspace of an opponent 143 . It reduces the number of alternatives one needs to take intoaccount in devising counter strategies. It makes the system more predictable. Secondly,understanding of the fact that one is operating within and against a system both within anenvironment may enable one to compensate for the result that would otherwise occur 144 . Ifone knows that something might happen one can anticipate it, prepare for it therebyreducing the chance of it occurring if only by making the other belief that that particularoption has been covered. A third strategy is aiming for indirect effects and apply multiple policiesboth in the expectation that the cumulative effect will lead to the other having problems toadapt 145 . If one measure fails, another one may succeed or the interaction of them may betoo much to cope with. A form of this is manipulating the environment in which the systemsoperate, for example widening or narrowing the number of allies. A final suggestion Jervismakes is to leave yourself some slack, some flexibility and room to respond if theiranticipations are incorrect 146 .The non-linear nature of warIn similar vein several authors have attempted to relate war with chaoplexity. An early studywas done by Alvin Saperstein who examined the outbreak of war, arms races, underlyingcauses of stability and instability of regions from a chaoplexity theoretical point of view. Hepointed out that while the international system shows considerable stability and hence141 Ibid, p.45.142 Ibid, p.89.143 Ibid, p.261.144 Ibid.145 Ibid.146 Ibid, p.194.158