Science, Strategy and War The Strategic Theory of ... - Boekje Pienter

ecognize and eliminate the weeds that always spring from ignorance; it should show howone thing is related to another and keep the important and unimportant separate. Theorycannot equip the mind with formula’s for solving problems, nor can it make the narrow pathon which the sole solution is supposed to lie by planting a hedge of principles on either side.But it can give the mind insight into the great mass of phenomena and of their relationships,then leave it free to rise into the higher realms of action 58 .And it is this feature in particular that strategists cherish in strategic theory, andsubsequently it is the Clausewitzian view on theory that permeates this study, which is moreconcerned with explaining, providing insights and education than with predicting. Theorywill have fulfilled its main task when it is used to analyze the constituent elements of war, todistinguish precisely what at first sight seems fused, to explain in full the properties of themeans employed and to show their probable effects, to define clearly the nature of the endsin view, and to illuminate all phases of warfare in a thorough critical inquiry.Theory then becomes a guide to anyone who wants to learn about war from books;it will light his way, ease his progress, train his judgment, and help him avoid pitfalls 59 .Although quite a few military theorists aim to uncover the single principle governing war andproving victory, and who aspire for scientific capacity to predict and control 60 , the commonexpectation of military strategic theory today, and the one employed here, is, in Colin Gray’swords, ‘to educate the mind by providing intellectual organization, defining terms, suggestingconnections among apparently disparate matters, and offering speculative consequentialistpostulates’ 61 . It must in particular provide insight into the dynamics of war.This interpretation of the meaning and utility of theory, which deviates from themore positivist interpretations of science, is related to the reasons for employing and makingtheory. Clausewitz, Mahan, and John Boyd all aimed to educate military leaders. Clausewitzconsidered strategy a form of creative intellectual activity, and theory was meant to providethe foundation for this activity, to provide a point of reference for thought processes and tooffer a way of thinking, not what to think. His aim was to provide a system of learning forthose in higher levels of command 62 . Or in Clausewitz’ own words, ‘It is not what we havethought, but rather how we have thought it, that we consider to be our contribution totheory’ 63 . In short, theory must help explain and understand. For the premier naval strategistAlfred Thayer Mahan the formulation of theory, or the construction of a philosophicallycomplete system of explanation was either secondary or hostile to the accomplishment of hisprimary task which, like Clausewitz he considered to be the education of militarycommanders 64 .Boyd too was primarily interested in educating his audience. He attempted not somuch to instill verities but to impart a way of thinking about war and strategy. Boyd was insome respects like Mahan who was concerned with the creation of a ‘disciplined yet flexible58 Clausewitz, On War, p.578.59 Ibid, p.141.60 In fact, most authors on strategy aim to argue that a specific method will most likely under allcircumstances provide victory. Famous authors such as Jomini, Douhet and Liddell Hart were notabove that. Quincy Wright states on p.112 that the ‘primary test of science is its capacity to predictand control’,61 Gray, Modern Strategy, p.36.62 Jon Tetsuro Sumida, Inventing Grand Strategy and Teaching Command (The Woodrow Wilson CenterPress, Washington, D.C., 1997), p.139.63 Ghyczy et al, Clausewitz on Strategy, p.185.64 See for Mahan's views on the purpose of theory, doctrine and history Sumida, Inventing Grand Strategyand Teaching Command, in particular chapter 6.23