Science, Strategy and War The Strategic Theory of ... - Boekje Pienter

1927 Born in Erie, Pennsylvania1946 Drafted into the US Army, served with occupation forces in Japan1952 Attended USAF pilot training at Williams Air Force Base, Arizona1953 Flew 22 combat sorties in the F-86 Sabre in the 51 st Fighter Interceptor Wing during the Korean War1954 Attended the Fighter Weapons School Instructor Course and remained as an instructor at the school1957 Published 1 st article on air combat in the Fighter Weapons School Newsletter1960 Aerial Attack Study is published for the first time1961 Attended Georgia Tech University, received B.S. Industrial Engineering, in 19621962 Stationed at Eglin AFB, Florida as an engineer. Developed concepts of Energy Maneuverability1966 Sent to Pentagon to begin work on the FX fighter project, which would become the F-15 Eagle1970-1975 Worked in the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD). Began work in the Reform Movement.Retired from active duty in 19751975 continued working as a civilian in OSD. Began studying and writing about conflict and warfare1976 completes New conception for Air-to-Air Combat1976 First draft of Destruction and Creation completed1977 First draft of Patterns of Conflict completed1982 First draft Organic Designs for Command and Control completed1986 First draft of The Strategic Game of ? and ? completed1987 Final versions of Organic Designs for Command and Control and The Strategic Game of ? and ? complete1987 widespread dissemination of A Discourse on Winning and Losing, which includes previous works1992 Conceptual Spiral completed and added to A Discourse1995 The Essence of Winning and Losing (The Big Sqeeze) completed1997 Colonel Boyd died March 9According to Hammond, what Boyd learned and did there constituted the basis fornearly everything he thought and did later. It was a truly transformational experience andprovided the foundation for all of his later contributions, not only in air-to-air tactics, energymaneuverability, and aircraft design but also in his development of OODA loops, histhinking on strategy and maneuver warfare, and ultimately his thought on time and thinkingitself 4 .What intrigued him was that despite flying in F-86 aircraft with a lower ceiling, awider turn radius and slower maximum speed than its rival, the Russian Mig-15, the kill ratiowas 10:1 in favor of the F-86 during the Korean War. Varying quality of training on bothsides affected this ratio with US training level far exceeding that of the North Korean pilots.Still, this could not explain all, if for no other anomaly that de North-Koreans often achievednumerical superiority during air-to-air combat. What also contributed was the bubble canopyof the F-86, which provided a distinct advantage over the constrained view offered by theMig-15 canopy in visually detecting enemy aircraft. But Boyd was convinced another elementwas at play as well, a question he took with him to the next position, together with hisconsiderable tactical prowess, ‘the guts of his real education’ 5 .Boyd was assigned to the USAF Fighter Weapons School at Nellis Air Force Basenear Las Vegas first as a student, and following graduation, as a fighter weapons ad tacticsinstructor. This school focused on air-to-ground and air-to-air gunnery. Air combat tacticswas a neglected subject, something Boyd corrected immediately. In the capacity of tacticsinstructor he acquired the reputation of “40 second Boyd” which amounted to a bet that hecould beat any pilot within 40 seconds in a 1 versus 1 air combat set up, a bet he usuallywon. More importantly he trusted his insights on tactics on paper, publishing several articlesin the professional journal of the Fighter Weapons School.4 Hammond, p.35.5 Ibid, p.39.41