Science, Strategy and War The Strategic Theory of ... - Boekje Pienter

The extraordinary forces are used to take the enemy by surprise. Indeed, what is unorthodoxand orthodox, expected or strange, direct or indirect, regular or irregular, extraordinary ornormal (to name a few meanings of cheng and ch’i) is dependent on the opponent, so theactions of both sides are again mutually influenced. Here we see again a concept that aims toget the opponent off balance, this time using the expectations of the opponent’s commanderand employing forces in ways, times, places, movements and formations he does not expectit. It is important to note that Sun Tzu does not advocate one above the other, the indirectnor the direct but stresses the novel combination of both 92 . It is from the interaction of theunorthodox and the orthodox that the enemy is confused, demoralized, disorganized,dislocated, looking at the wrong direction etc. Variation and novel combinations of types offorces, of maneuvers and methods of deception and deceit are important.However, understanding the enemy’s dispositions (hsing) and his potential power(shih) and knowing how to apply the concept of the orthodox and unorthodox is not enough.It is incomplete unless one knows how to target one’s forces against the enemy’s dispositionand power. The commander must have an appreciation for the concept of the polaropposites emptiness (hsu) and fullness, or solidness (shih), or the vacuous and substantial. Hsu meansempty or weak in a sense that goes beyond the physical. To be empty in the Hsu sense canindicate a poorly defended position or a well defended position with weak morale, lack oflegitimate purpose or feeble leadership. Hsu indicates the crevices in an opponent’s defenseswhich allow penetration. Conversely, shih can be a strongly defended position or a capableforce that has every positive quality. It has high morale, strong leadership and its actions arein accord with its moral code. The problem is that no position of force is permanently solid(nor empty for that matter) and Sun Tzu sees this as a way of providing the opponent withthe dilemma we already stumbled upon: what to defend and what to attack 93 .The correct use of the concept of the emptiness and solidness combined with theeffects of previous concepts, creates a situation where one will be able to find and attack aweak spot in the enemy’s defenses. By being formless, unfathomable and quick, theopponent will need to disperse, as we have seen, and by attacking or moving towards objectshe values we disrupt his plans and disperse his units even further. Thus we create a situationwhere the opponent does indeed have identifiable strong points and weaknesses, which wecan subsequently exploit by suddenly concentrating our force there and have superiority inmental, moral and physical power.The Art of War contains a comprehensive holistic view, which provides a generaltheory of war. Boyd’s work resembles The Art of War in that both stress context,connections, change and recognizing patterns as prime factors for cognition. Boyd followsSun Tzu again when the latter argues that any favorable outcome of a conflict is the result ofmultiple methods applied simultaneously at several levels and reinforcing one another andshaping conditions for others to be effective. War is not only the affair of armies. Informulating strategy one should address the entire enemy system. At the grand strategic levelthis is manifest in the list of strategies available which include diplomatic, economic andmilitary methods. At the military strategic level, operational and tactical level we see it in theinteractions of the supporting concepts which all, at the different levels, aim to get theenemy off balance, to isolate sections of the opponent at different aggregation levels of hissystem. Actions are not exclusively aimed at one particular domain, be it the physical orexhausted. The unorthodox and the orthodox mutually produce each other, just like an endless cycle.Who can exhaust them?’92 Saywer has a good discussion on this on pp.147-150, but see also Hamlett, pp.13-15 and O'Dowdand Waldon, ‘Sun Tzu for Strategists’, Comparative Strategy, Volume 10, 1991, p.30.93 The source for this section is O'Dowd and Waldron, p.31-32.63