Science, Strategy and War The Strategic Theory of ... - Boekje Pienter

(both aim to achieve a goal through a certain plan) 48 . Theory in this field assists in decidingwhether and how to employ a particular strategy by offering an abstract conceptual model(or a quasi-deductive theory) of each strategy and general knowledge of the conditions thatfavor the success of a strategy and conversely, the conditions that make its success unlikely 49 .An abstract conceptual model of a strategy - such as deterrence and coercivediplomacy - identifies the critical variables of that strategy and the general logic that isassociated with successful use of that instrument of policy. The abstract model itself is not astrategy but merely a starting point for constructing a strategy. The abstract model identifiesonly the general logic - that is the desired impact on the adversary’s calculations and behavior- that is needed for it to be successful. But it does not indicate precisely what the policymaker has to do to induce that logic into the adversary’s calculations. To achieve that resultthe policymaker has to tailor the abstract model into a specific strategy for the particularsituation at hand 50 .The abstract conceptual model is neither a full-fledged deductive theory. A fullydeveloped deductive theory of deterrence or coercive diplomacy, if properly constructed,could be used to predict whether the strategy would succeed or fail in a particular situation.To have this potency however, the abstract model would have to be operationalized. All itsvariable-components as well as the interaction among them would have to be capable ofbeing specified and measured. Fully aware of the highly contextual, dynamic and interactivearena of international conflict, George readily admits that fully developed deductive theoriesof foreign policy strategies do not exist and will be difficult to develop 51 .The second category of knowledge is generic knowledge of conditions favoring astrategy. The limited contribution of abstract conceptual models can be compensated forsomewhat by identifying conditions that, if present in a particular case, favor the success of astrategy. Generic knowledge of this kind can be obtained only by means of empiricalresearch that systematically compares instances when the strategy succeeded with cases inwhich it failed. In doing so the investigator identifies variables and conditions that accountfor or explain the variance in the outcomes of a strategy. Generalizations are referred to asconditional when they identify factors that appear to have favored success of the strategy andother conditions that are associated with likely failure of the strategy. Given the complexityof international relations phenomena, it is most unlikely that valid universal generalizationswill be discovered, neither should this be the aim. Instead, it is preferable to regard thoseconditions that do seem to have causal importance in explaining some successes of a strategyas favoring conditions. That is, the presence of these conditions in a particular case makes astrategy more likely to succeed. But favoring conditions are neither necessary nor sufficientfor the success of a strategy 52 .48 As Walt notes 'Strategy is thus a 'policy science' in the manner described by Alexander George andRichard Smoke in Deterrence in American Forgeign Policy: Theory and Practice', Walt, p. 142, footnote 2.49 Alexander George, Bridging the Gap, Theory and Practice in Foreign Policy, United States Institute ofPeace Press, Washington DC, 1993, p.117.50 Ibid, pp.117-118.51 Ibid, pp.119-12052 Ibid, pp.120-122. The third type of knowledge - an actor-specific behavioral model of the adversary- required for dealing effectively with other states policy makers need what is often referred to as acorrect image of the opponent. Faulty images of each other are a source of misperceptions andmiscalculations that have often led to major errors in policy, avoidable catastrophes, and missedopportunities. In addition, policymakers need to understand the adversary's image of them. George isvery close to John Boyd's model, as will later become apparent, when George mentions that forestablishing a correct image specific research is necessary on a particular opponent, on his belief21