Science, Strategy and War The Strategic Theory of ... - Boekje Pienter

planning process which included variations and contingency plans;extensive information gathering operations which reduced uncertainty and simplified theplanning process;the use of flexible and confusing configurations of units,that combined with screening operations masked his real intentions and movementsthus ensuring security;the use of strategic dispersion and tactical contraction to create strategic confusion;which led to tactical dislocation of units,which by rapid concentration of one’s own troops could be overwhelmed;and finally by a rapid succession and evershifting kaleidoscope of (strategic) moves anddiversions which upset the enemy’s actions, unsettle his plans and unbalance himpsychologically which combined ensure a constant level of initiative.Napoleon furthermore used unified lines of operations as the basis for mutual supportbetween units. He threatened enemy communications to isolate the opponent. He forced theopponent to fight under unfavorable conditions through operations that held or diverted theenemy (feints, pinning maneuvers) and by attacks against exposed flanks or through weakfronts. All the while he maintained freedom of maneuver by setting up centers of operationsand alternative lines of communications and keep (at least some) open. As for command andcontrol, Napoleon initially used a centralized concept with a low degree of tactical variety,which created strategic success to produce tactical success. So higher level confusion withinthe enemy camp must make up for lower level uniformity of Napoleon’s units and theiroperations.In later campaigns Napoleon exchanged variety, rapidity and surprise for rigiduniformity and massed artillery fire, dense infantry columns and heavy artillery againstregions of strong resistance. He deemphasized loose, irregular methods at the tactical level.And in the end he thus failed 47 . In his analysis of Napoleon Boyd sees in the early victories asubstantiation of Boyd’s own views and in the latter of Napoleon’s less victorious campaignhe finds fault with the loss of variety and flexibility. In light of the fact that both Clausewitzand Jomini, the premier analists of Napoleon’s art of war, in particular focus on the latercampaigns, it should not be surprising to see Boyd turn his critique on these very influentialtheorists too.Boyd lists some key elements of the Clausewitzian view on strategy. According to Boyd,Clausewitz proposed a strategy along the following lines:Exhaust the enemy by influencing him to increase his expenditure of effort.Seek out centers of gravity upon which all power/movement depend and, if possible,trace them back to a single one.Compress all effort, against those centers, into the fewest possible actions.Subordinate all minor or secondary actions as much as possible.Move at the utmost speed.Seek a major battle (with superiority of number and conditions) that will promise adecisive victory.47 Ibid, p.31. Here he obviously followed the contentious views of Liddell Hart, Lawrence and Fuller.As Azar Gat makes clear, Liddell Hart too made the mistake of missing the points that (1) the alliedforces learned during the protracted wars against Napoleon and (2) that the blatant aggression led totheir adoption of several tactical and stragical methods of Napoleon including mass mobilization. SoNapoleon's failure cannot be attributed to his tactical concepts. See Gat(1998) p.165.190