Science, Strategy and War The Strategic Theory of ... - Boekje Pienter

communication and explicit direction, which will reduce response times. As stated before,higher commands must shape the ‘decision space’ of subordinate commanders and,connected by a common frame of reference and direction in the form of a goal or focus,these commanders will remain connected to the entire system.Survival of military units depend on having a very specific kind of commandarrangement with both explicit control mechanisms and feedback loops, as well as implicitones formed by common frames of reference, shared ideas, shared experiences, trust, etc.Trust is the glue of Boyd’s command system. It is the basis for social cohesion. Throughtrust, you gain respect, loyalty, and common purpose, without it you need detailed orders torun things. By giving units and subordinate commanders trust and freedom of action theycan ensure the optimum conditions for the actions, they can adapt as necessary. This leavesroom for initiative. Combined with a common outlook and a common doctrine all one reallyneeds is a goal. If everyone understands clearly and is attuned to the organization’s purposeor the commander’s intent, explicit communication beyond the objective is superfluous for aunit. Because of the shared outlook one knows what to do and what one can expect ofothers, be it supporting units, higher commands etc. Implicit communication will suffice.This rendering of mission type orders or Auftragstaktik is derived from Blitzkrieg.Auftragstaktik builds on, and requires trust among and across all levels. It requires initiative,flexibility and freedom of action for the lower levels. Relying on implicit communication andcommon outlook saves time in the OODA cycle and makes detailed supervisionunnecessary. This ensures the timely and suitable adaptation of the system as a whole. Itallows lower units to read their environment and respond adequately within the overallframework of the larger system and towards the goals of that larger system. The higher levelscan set the boundaries and the direction. That defines the latitude for lower level units. Itshouldn’t go beyond that.Command, Boyd indicates, is a wrong term, as is control. Basically Boyd advocateslateral relations and avoiding a top down hierarchical system. It must be a top down, a lateralas well as a bottom up process. There must be continuous open two-way communication.Higher command levels must restrain themselves in their desire to want to know all that isgoing on at lower levels as well as their desire to interfere. They must trust and coach. Theymust encourage cooperation and consultation among lower levels. They must accept badnews and be open for suggestions, lower level initiatives and critique. It is thus more aquestion of leadership and monitoring where monitoring involves an appreciation of what isgoing on and comparing this to what is expected. At the strategic an grand strategic levels anequivalent dynamic is argued. Leaders should develop attractive and inspiring national goalsand philosophies that unite the nation.Boyd thus developed an internally consistent command philosophy that can also berelated to his ideas on operational art and organizational survival. He is able to tie it to theOODA loop and explain it in those terms. It also fits hand in glove with his propositionthat, if one wants to survive and prosper, one must be able to adapt, evolve and learn betterand faster then the opponent. Boyd’s command philosophy is essential for the Boydianoperational art to succeed. Boyd in fact re-invents and reformulates Auftragstaktik. Theconcept of Auftragstaktik is the organic way of ensuring that all levels within an organization(which should be decentralized) can adapt to their environments while as a unified entitythey still head in a common direction. And its success is self-reinforcing. The strategic andoperational levels set the overall direction and make sure there is variety of action andrapidity and keep the opponent guessing. This will translate into tactical advantage for lowerlevels, for the tactical units of the opponent will be misguided by their confused highercommand level. Strategic mismatches create tactical mismatches which in turn, in the next278