Science, Strategy and War The Strategic Theory of ... - Boekje Pienter

Turbulent environmentThis conviction was shared by all US services. Vietnam revealed deep deficiencies in all fourservices and in response each of the services drew the appropriate lessons from Vietnam andreacted with determined and, in some cases, quite far-reaching reforms 110 . None of theservices had been able to formulate a coherent military strategy, if there was one feasible inthe first place, for the challenges of Vietnam except the insistence on pursuing a war winingstrategy in stead of the half-hearted “signaling” approach of Johnson and McNamara. Yeteach remained badly divided on the details of implementation, with each typically advocatinghis own service’s wherewithal as the preferred answer to the challenge 111 .So after Vietnam, the US Army, US Navy and US Marines were keenly aware of thedoctrinal problems they were facing, despite the fact that in particular the US Army hadexperimented with the Air Mobile Division and achieved remarkable but oftenunderappreciated tactical successes 112 . Indeed, of all the armed forces in the 1960s, the Armymost perfectly conformed to the doctrine of Flexible Response and its emphasis on nonnuclearaction 113 . Yet the US Army, along with the other services experienced problemsconcerning morale of troops, drug abuse, desertion, mutiny 114 . Naveh cites US Army generalDon Starry who noted in 1985, after a long and difficult process of formulating newoperational level doctrine, that ‘for all practical purposes, the study of operations ended inthe US Army after World War II. Perhaps the belief that nuclear weapons meant the end ofconventional land warfare was to blame, but whatever the cause, the knowledge of largeunits operations declined continually even with the object lesson of Korea before us’. TheUS Marines, for their part, adhered to true and trusted principles of amphibious warfare andthus maintained a narrow focus of their mission.Thus, Vietnam’s impact on the American military was dramatic 115 . Indeed, theperiod from Jimmy Carter’s presidency to Ronald Reagan’s second term was one of intensesoul-searching and turmoil within the US defense establishment. There was confusion aboutnational security strategy, national military strategy, the transition from conscription to an allvolunteerforce, military relevant technologies, arms control, fights among the services onindividual weapons systems and just why the war had been lost. The military had to reinventitself after military defeat and steel itself for challenges at both ends of the spectrum 116 .While most military professionals believed that the Vietnam War had been ineptly conceivedand badly run and disillusionment with political and military leadership inculcated an attitudeof mistrust that manifested itself in bitterness toward senior military and civilian leadership, italso drove a zealous desire for internal reform 117 .110 Ibid, p.54.111 Ibid, p.49.112 See for a short but representative summary of (mostly tactical) things that went right, for instanceLambeth and Hallion, pp.21-23. Vietnam saw the use of ‘smart’ weapons, excellent air-groundcoordination, widespread effective employment of air mobile operations with helicopters and thedevelopment of the armed helicopter.113 Addington, p.291.114 Hallion, pp.17-18.115 Ibid.116 Hammond, p.106.117 Hallion, p.18.68